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ABSTRACT 
 
Existing research has continued to demonstrate that experiences of paranoia are 
best understood as lying on a continuum, across both clinical and non-clinical 
populations. Within the non-clinical population, experiences of paranoia have been 
associated with gender, with the predominant pattern being a higher prevalence 
rate amongst males. The aim of this study was to further investigate this 
relationship, utilising a qualitative and discursive approach to data collection and 
analysis. This approach was chosen in order to address concerns with the 
predominantly reductive methodologies commonly utilised in investigations of both 
gender and paranoia. 
 
The culturally available discourses of ‘paranoia’ and ‘gender’ were investigated 
through conducting semi-structured interviews with nine interviewees, recruited 
from a non-clinical, student population. Transcripts of interviews were 
subsequently analysed using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA).  
 
The findings of the study demonstrated gendered aspects of discursive 
constructions of paranoia, as well as ways in which men and women are positioned 
differently within discourse, and the resultant potential consequences for individual 
subjective experience. Common constructions of paranoia in men were of an 
experience related to external and physical threats, expressed through an 
unpredictable and aggressive manner; whilst paranoia in women was constructed 
as more normalised and based in social and intimate relationships, expressed in 
an open manner, and shared with others. Implications of these findings suggest 
that considerations of gender should be brought more to the fore in both research 
and clinical practice, to provide a more nuanced understanding of the experience 
of paranoia. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview of Chapter 
 
This introduction chapter will aim to provide an overview of current and past 
research into the experience of paranoia, whilst also providing a rationale for the 
current study. The chapter will present the differing ways in which paranoia has 
come to be defined, critiquing traditional associations with abnormality and 
mental health. Following this, there will be an exploration of how thinking has 
moved on from this categorical view towards a continuum model and more single 
symptom approach, in which paranoia is investigated in the general population. A 
particular focus will then be given to the social and demographic factors which 
have been previously associated with experiences of paranoia, both in clinical 
and non-clinical contexts. The chapter will then move to focus more closely on 
the relatively under investigated associations between gender and paranoia. 
There will be a consideration of the potential flaws of a traditional empiricist 
exploration of gender and paranoia, before a more discursive approach is 
presented as an appropriate alternative. Finally, the current study, aims, 
approach and objectives will be introduced. 
 
1.2. Literature Search Strategy 
 
The literature search was conducted through the use of the following electronic 
databases: PsycINFO (2001-2017), PsycARTICLES (2001-2017), and Google 
Scholar (2001-2017). The search utilised the following terms: (i) general 
population OR nonclinical AND paranoi* OR persecutory OR delusion OR 
psychosis. Papers were screened for inclusion through an initial reading of the 
title and abstract, in order to identify papers with a focus on experiences of 
paranoia in the non-clinical population, as well as potential gender differences. 
Searches were initially limited to the period 2001-2017 but following the 
identification of specific papers, subsequent papers were found through snowball 
searches of the relevant reference lists.  
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1.3. Defining paranoia 
 
‘Paranoia’ as a term has come to be widely used throughout everyday life, as well 
as within psychiatric and medical settings. This utilisation in multiple contexts 
appears to occur without a unified agreement on meaning. Within the Oxford 
English Dictionary two main definitions are provided, reflecting the varying ways 
in which the term has come to be used. The first of these defines the term as:  
“mental illness characterized by a persistent delusional system, usually 
on the theme of persecution, exaggerated personal importance, or 
sexual fantasy or jealousy, often as a manifestation of schizophrenia.” 
In contrast to this primarily medical and psychiatric construction of paranoia, the 
second definition appears to provide a broader and more generalised description. 
“any unjustified or excessive sense of fear; esp. an unreasonable fear 
of the actions or motives of others.” 
 
Examining these definitions highlights a distinction between two quite differing 
constructions of the term ‘paranoia’. Paranoia is seemingly used both as 
abnormality or “mental illness”, and to describe a more general although 
“unreasonable” fear. This distinction poses the question as to whether paranoia 
as a term describes a distinct abnormal experience, or whether the term 
represents more of a spectrum of experience, present both within general 
population and at more severe and ‘clinically relevant’ level. Within research 
literature and clinical practice, this question has historically been debated and 
explored through the categorical vs continuum debate (David, 2010; Van Os, 
Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009), which will be the 
focus of the early parts of this chapter. 
 
1.3.1. The categorical approach to paranoia 
 
In the field of psychiatry, paranoia has historically been largely viewed as a 
distinct and abnormal experience, and therefore as separate from reality or 
normal functioning. This categorical approach positions symptoms such as 
paranoia and delusional beliefs as qualitatively different to ‘normal’ experiences, 
and therefore part of discrete mental health diagnoses (Straus, 1969; van Os, 
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2003). This viewpoint can be retroactively traced and located within the original 
conception of the Dementia Praecox and Schizophrenia constructs at the turn of 
the twentieth century (Miller, 1986), within which paranoid experiences played a 
central role. Since this early part of psychiatry’s history, the categorical view has 
continued to be the predominant approach in modern psychiatric practice. Until 
very recently, Paranoid Schizophrenia was a commonly used sub-type of the 
diagnosis of Schizophrenia within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth 
Edition (DSM-IV), since removed due to “poor description of the heterogeneity of 
schizophrenia” and “low diagnostic stability” (Tandon et al, 2013). 
 
Within the currently used Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition (DSM-V) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), experiences of paranoia are now 
subsumed under the symptom constructs of Delusions and Paranoid Ideation. 
References to these symptoms can be found within several categories of 
psychiatric disorder, including Psychotic Disorders, Bipolar and Related 
Disorders, Depressive Disorders, Personality Disorders, and several others. The 
DSM-V provides a definition of a Delusion as “fixed beliefs that are not amenable 
to change in light of conflicting evidence”, whilst a persecutory delusion is 
described as “belief that one is going to be harmed, harassed, and so forth by an 
individual, organization, or other group” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 
p. 87).  
 
Separate from the construct of ‘delusion’, there are references to a less severe 
form of paranoia, or the existence of a spectrum of paranoid experiences. This 
can be found within the DSM-V definition of Paranoid Ideation which is defined as 
“Ideation, of less than delusional proportions, involving suspiciousness or the 
belief that one is being harassed, persecuted, or unfairly treated” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 819). The inclusion of ideation points towards 
some acknowledgment of experiences of paranoia as lying more on a symptom 
continuum ranging from thoughts and ideation, up to a fixed belief held with a 
high level of certainty (Freeman, 2016). However, despite this nod towards a 
continuum approach, the DSM-V remains categorical in its requirement for 
distinction between ‘delusion’ and ‘ideation’; “The distinction between a delusion 
and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on 
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the degree of conviction with which the belief is held despite clear or reasonable 
contradictory evidence regarding its veracity” (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013, p. 87).  
 
1.3.2. Problems with a categorical approach 
 
The placing of a categorical distinction between abnormal delusions of clinical 
significance and more general experiences of paranoid ideation or thinking can 
be seen as problematic in a number of ways. This section will aim to consider the 
most salient of these arguments, before considering the merit of a continuum 
approach, and presenting the definition or construction of paranoia that will be 
utilised throughout this thesis. 
 
1.3.2.1. Variability in beliefs and experiences 
The DSM-V emphasis of distinction based on the fixed nature of belief, conflicts 
with large amounts of research demonstrating the often fluctuating nature of 
individuals’ level of conviction in their belief (Harper, 2004; Ross, 2014), even 
amongst those diagnosed with delusional beliefs (Appelbaum, Robbins & 
Vesselinov, 2004; Garety, 1985). Treatment of delusional beliefs through 
therapies such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) rely upon the notion that 
beliefs are not fixed, offering intervention in the form of exposure, reality testing, 
and cognitive therapy (van der Gaag, Valmaggia & Smit, 2014). In a small-scale 
study conducted by Chadwick and Lowe (1990) six participants diagnosed with 
delusional beliefs of a duration longer than two years, voluntarily participated in a 
reality testing intervention. Significant changes in conviction of belief were 
demonstrated in all but one of the participants. In a more recent study by 
Freeman et al (2016), 30 participants diagnosed with persecutory delusions were 
treated using a virtual reality form of exposure and cognitive therapy, leading to 
significant and large reductions in delusion conviction. When closely tracked over 
time, these changes in beliefs during therapy appear to occur in a fluctuating 
manner, with clients moving back and forth in their conviction, as opposed to a 
definitive moment of change that would be suggested by the more categorical 
construction of delusions as fixed (Messari & Hallam, 2003). The traditional 
categorical approach struggles to account for this evidence of this apparent 
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variable nature of strength of belief (Harper, 2004). At what point should a belief 
be considered a ‘strongly held idea’ or ‘paranoid ideation’ versus a ‘delusion’ or 
‘fixed belief’, when movement can occur between the two, and there exists 
amenability to change? 
 
1.3.2.2. Judging validity of beliefs and experiences 
A further important critique of the categorical approach to delusions and 
paranoia, surrounds the criterion of falsity of beliefs (Harper, 2004). Both DSM-V 
and dictionary definitions of these experiences, point towards the requirement 
that beliefs are false, unjustified or contrary to evidence. This approach to 
distinguishing paranoid from non-paranoid beliefs requires us to take a naïve 
realist view of the world, in which we assume all belief systems are managed in 
this way (Georgaca, 2000; Harper, 2004; 1996). Harper (2004) critiques this 
assumption through considering how this expectation of evaluating beliefs based 
on evidence conflicts with what we know about how people manage their beliefs 
in general. Sharot and Garrett (2016) discuss how, contrary to the popular 
assumption of rationality and reality testing, decisions about beliefs are formed 
primarily through biases and systematic errors in reasoning, including a process 
of valence whereby particular attention is placed on desirable information, whilst 
undesirable is ignored. If this is the process by which ‘normal’ beliefs are formed, 
why is there an expectation placed on those who’s beliefs are constructed as 
paranoid to utilise evidence and logic (Harper, 2004)? Additionally, Georgaca 
(2004) argues that the plausibility of a belief is formed and judged through 
discursive processes, and not a form of logical or empirical reality testing. 
Therefore, the more categorical approach to paranoia and delusional beliefs 
appears flawed both in its expectation of drawing a clear distinction between true 
beliefs that reflect reality and those that are false, and in the assumption of logic 
and reasoning processes. 
 
1.3.2.3. Paranoia in the general population 
Perhaps the most significant challenge to the categorical approach, comes from 
research demonstrating the prevalence of paranoid and delusional experiences 
amongst non-clinical populations (Harper, 2004). In a large scale study in the 
Netherlands looking at experiences within the general population, 7076 people 
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were interviewed as part of the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence 
Study (NEMESIS). Within this randomised general population sample, a 17.5% 
overall incidence rate of symptoms associated with psychosis was reported, 
along with 8.7% meeting the criteria for delusional beliefs, despite only 2.1% of 
the sample having a formal DSM-III diagnosis (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 
2000). Again, looking at the experience of delusional beliefs in the general 
population, Freeman (2006) conducted a review of available epidemiological 
literature; across the included studies, it was found that up to 15% of the 
nonclinical population reported experiencing regular delusional ideation, with up 
to 6% presenting with a delusional belief but not at the severity warranting 
diagnosis.  
 
Looking more specifically at experiences of paranoia, in a non-clinical population 
study, between 47% and 70% of a sample of 324 students reported experiences 
of paranoia that varied from concerns about the hostile intent of others, to more 
benign experiences of suspicion (Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, 2003). In a similar 
study conducted by Freeman (2005) around a third of 1202 internet surveyed 
participants reported paranoid thoughts, arranged on a hierarchy from 
suspiciousness up to persecutory delusions. Larger scale survey studies in the 
UK have also demonstrated paranoid experiences within the broader population. 
One such study looking at data available from a large scale psychiatric morbidity 
survey in the UK, demonstrated paranoid ideation in 20-30% of the population, 
with some variability according to types of ideation (Bebbington et al, 2013). In a 
similar study conducted by Freeman et al (2011) looking at large scale survey 
data, paranoid experiences were not only shown to be highly prevalent within the 
general population at 18.6%, but also to be associated with many markers of 
wellbeing, social functioning and other mental health difficulties.  
 
Beyond purely survey based data, studies have shown how paranoia can be 
demonstrated in non-clinical individuals within an experimental situation. A virtual 
reality study measuring persecutory paranoia in 200 individuals from the general 
population, found that over 40% of participants endorsed paranoid thinking during 
a neutral virtual reality simulation (Freeman, et al, 2008). This research has been 
well replicated and expanded upon to further explore the spectrum of paranoia 
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experiences. A similar virtual reality study by Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley 
and Slater (2010) demonstrated different levels of paranoid experiences within a 
sample from the general population, ranging from lower level paranoia to 
persecutory delusions, as well as linking these with experiences of anxiety, worry, 
trauma and interpersonal sensitivity. 
 
Taking an overall view, in a systematic review of 47 studies investigating 
‘psychotic’ phenomena in the general population, the median rate of prevalence 
of psychotic phenomena in broad terms, was found to be between 5% and 8%, 
compared with an average reported prevalence of psychosis diagnosis of 0.7% 
(Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, Krabbendam, 2009). 
Acknowledgement of the prevalence of these experiences within the non-clinical 
population on a spectrum of intensity, has led to calls for the abandonment of 
“outdated” categorical disease model and for a more continuum based approach 
to psychotic symptoms such as paranoia (Van Os, 2003).  
 
1.3.3. The continuum approach to paranoia 
 
Taken together, these arguments demonstrate the limitations of considering 
paranoia or delusional beliefs in a purely categorical manner, whilst also 
suggesting that a more continuum based conceptualisation would have greater 
validity and utility (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). One of the earliest 
proponents of a continuum based approach was Strauss (1969). Drawing upon 
research interviews that demonstrated the lack of diagnostic validity in symptoms 
of hallucinations and delusions, he proposed a continuum of functioning as 
opposed to a definitive categorical distinction. In this model, psychotic 
phenomena were understood to lie on a dimension with ‘normal’ experiences, as 
opposed to being considered either present or absent (Strauss, 1969). Van Os, 
Hanssen, Bijl, and Ravelli (2000) proposed that this notion of a continua of 
functioning be broadened beyond clinical populations to span the population in 
general. Expanding further on these ideas Johns and van Os (2001) reviewed the 
literature available at the time, proposing a continuum model understanding of 
the positive symptoms of psychosis, whereby as individuals move up the 
spectrum of experiences they also increase in need for care or support. This 
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contradicts a more categorical understanding, whereby need for care due to the 
presence of ‘illness’ or ‘disorder’ is predicated on the presence or lack of 
presence of distinct symptoms.  
 
Critiques of the continuum approach have often focused on the viewpoint that 
they lack the validity and clinical utility that is provided by a diagnostic framework 
(Lawrie, Hall, McIntosh, Owens & Johnstone, 2010). However, this argument 
does not take into account the well replicated evidence demonstrating that 
categorical diagnostic frameworks themselves lack the level of validity and 
reliability that would render them clinical useful (Bentall, 2006). For example, 
taking the current DSM-V diagnostic framework for schizophrenia the kappa 
value for inter-rater reliability has been evaluated as 0.46, well below the 
recommended reliability level of 0.7 (Freedman et al, 2016). These critiques of 
the validity and reliability of diagnoses suggest an increased need for single 
symptom based research and clinical practice, whereby problems with diagnostic 
categories are circumvented, whilst preserving utility (Bentall, 2006). A single-
symptom approach follows the continuum model, in which normal and clinical 
phenomena exist on a dimension with each other, however focuses on particular 
symptoms, such as hallucinations or paranoia. Single-symptom research can 
investigate paranoia phenomena away from the constraints of diagnoses, 
considering different aspects such as degree of functioning and severity of 
experience, as opposed to purely their presence or absence (Freeman, 2007). 
 
David (2010) also considers some of the above criticism, providing a useful 
critique of overly simplified notions of a continuum approach to psychosis 
experiences. He called for an approach that recognises the separateness of the 
“epidemiology” continuum, acknowledging the prevalence across clinical and 
non-clinical populations, and the “phenomenological” continuum, recognising a 
separate spectrum of the type or severity of experience. This may therefore allow 
for a more nuanced understanding of the continuum, whereby we understand 
psychosis symptoms separately and as existing across the spectrum of 
population, but also across a spectrum of severity and phenomenology of 
experiences.  
 
  9 
1.3.4. Cognitive models of paranoia 
 
Cognitive models arguably provide a useful and more single symptom and 
continuum focused approach to conceptualising paranoid experiences (Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001; Freeman & Garety, 2004). 
Several varying cognitive models have been proposed, each emphasising 
particular different psychological processes. An earlier such cognitive model of 
paranoia provided by Garety and Hemsley (1994) emphasised the roll of 
perception, judgment, and reasoning biases in the formation of delusional and 
paranoid beliefs. Within this framework, paranoid experiences are understood as 
resulting from initial anomalous experiences, and subsequent errors or biases in 
reasoning. However, in reviewing the evidence supporting such a model, 
researchers have found only limited evidence for an overall impairment in 
reasoning ability, and instead found that research more supported the presence 
of data-gathering biases, and ‘jumping to conclusions’, in that those with 
delusional beliefs showed a tendency to seek less information before reaching a 
conclusion (Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
 
Taking a more affective approach to cognitive models, Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood and Kinderman (2001) propose the Attribution Self-
Representation Model. This model conceptualises paranoia as a dysfunctional 
attempt to manage low self-esteem, in which negative self-representations are 
thought to be avoided by attributing threatening events to the actions of another. 
Continuing to utilise these external attributions is thought to lead to an increase in 
paranoid thinking, through the consistent attribution of negative events to the 
hostile intentions of others. This model has been supported by evidence 
demonstrating the presence of attribution bias and low self-esteem within those 
reporting paranoid experiences, however has also been critiqued due to some 
inconsistencies in the association between paranoia and self-esteem (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999). However, inconsistencies may be a result of difficulties in 
reaching valid and reliable measuring of constructs such as ‘self-esteem’ (Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001). 
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Perhaps the most commonly utilised cognitive model of paranoia is one outlined 
by Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler and Bebbington (2002). This model aims to 
be multifactorial in nature, incorporating many of the elements of other proposed 
models, however rejects the concept of paranoia as a defence against low self-
esteem (Freeman, 2016). Paranoia is described within the model as related to 
the impact of a precipitator, such as a significant life event, interacting with a 
biological, psychological, or social vulnerability. The model outlines how these 
precipitators could lead to an anomalous experience and threat arousal, which in 
turn interact with cognitive bias’s and pre-existing self/other beliefs, potentially 
leading to the formation of a paranoid belief. Further cognitive processes such as 
confirmatory and attentional biases, and safety-behaviours and reinforcement, 
are hypothesised to play a role in the maintenance of any subsequently formed 
belief (Freeman, 2007).  
 
Overall, cognitive models of paranoia can provide a useful conceptualisation of 
the experience, taking into account a continuum based approach and offering a 
single symptom focus, whilst also contributing extensively to research in the area 
and the development of psychological interventions (Freeman, 2016; Freeman & 
Garety, 2004). However, they have been critiqued based on the lack of attention 
given to both the relational and interpersonal nature of paranoid experiences, and 
the importance of social context and environment (Cromby & Harper, 2009). 
These issues will be addressed in further detail later in this chapter, when the 
social and discursive model of paranoia is explored. 
 
1.3.5. The definition of paranoia in the present study 
 
Having outlined some of the problems inherent in the traditional categorical 
approach to paranoia, and outlined an alternative single-symptom continuum 
approach, this section of the chapter will go on to describe the definition of 
paranoia utilised in the present study. The present study adopts a 
conceptualisation of paranoia whereby it is understood to be a complex and 
interwoven experience, and therefore not fully separable from ‘delusions’. This 
approach is supported by findings in research such as Freeman et al (2005), 
whereby the paranoid thoughts of respondents were found to fit into a 
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hierarchical distribution, ranging from socially evaluative concerns to delusions of 
severe persecutory threat. This viewpoint considers paranoia and delusions as 
different from each other quantitatively, in terms of relative rates of incidence, but 
similar qualitatively or phenomenologically, in terms of the core experience 
(David, 2010). To that end, a useful definition of the construct for the focus of the 
present study is that provided by Cromby and Harper (2009). They define 
paranoia as “a way of perceiving and relating to other people and to the world 
that is characterised by some degree of suspicion, mistrust, or hostility”.  
 
The presence of well replicated evidence of experiences of paranoia in the non-
clinical population is important both as support for the continuum approach 
towards paranoia and delusional beliefs, and for revealing the relatively common 
nature of this type of emotional distress (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). 
In addition, further study of the phenomena of non-clinical paranoia can also 
potentially be of interest in increasing our understanding of the more severe and 
clinical end of the paranoia spectrum (Ellett & Wildschut, 2014; Freeman 2006). If 
experiences of paranoia lie on a continuum and are experienced within the 
general population, mental health services’ reliance on diagnostic systems may 
lead to the overlooking of an important and prevalent distressing phenomena, 
deserving of investigation in its own right, separately from any associated 
diagnoses (Freeman, 2006; 2007).  
 
1.4. Social and demographical factors associated with non-clinical paranoia 
 
This section of the chapter will provide a review of the social and demographical 
factors that have been associated with the experience of non-clinical paranoia, 
before moving on to outline why gender was made the focus of the present study. 
Due to the presence of a relatively limited amount of research specifically taking 
a single symptom approach to paranoia, studies looking at broader ‘psychotic’ 
symptoms in non-clinical populations will also be considered in this brief review, 
where relevant. However, it is important to note critiques of the construct of 
‘psychosis’ and ‘schizophrenia’ that demonstrate poor reliability and subsequent 
lack of validity, limiting the usefulness of these studies (Read, 2013). 
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In the large-scale Netherlands survey study previously described, the 
experiences of psychosis symptoms found in the non-clinical population were 
associated with female gender, younger age, urbanicity, lower income, lower 
level of education, unemployment, and single marital status (van Os, Hanssen, 
Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). In a similar survey study conducted by Subramaniam, 
Abdin, Vaingankar, Verma and Chong (2014), using data from 6616 participants 
in the Singapore Mental Health Study, non-clinical psychosis symptoms were 
found to be associated with female gender, lower-education, single marital status, 
and smoking. However, both studies did not explore whether this was also true of 
each subtype of psychotic symptom, and therefore specifically related to 
paranoia.  
 
In a review of literature on non-clinical psychosis-like experiences (PLEs) 
conducted by Kelleher and Cannon (2011), convergences and similarities in the 
risk factors associated with non-clinical psychosis were found when compared 
with comparable research into clinical psychosis. The researchers highlighted 
studies that showed associations with urbanicity, ethnic minority background, low 
social-economic status, unemployment, adverse childhood experiences, 
substance use, and single marital status, as well as with familial and “genetic 
risk”. Aiming for a similar overview, Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul 
and Krabbendam (2009) conducted a more meta-analytic review of 47 studies 
attempting to pull together explorations of demographic features associated with 
non-clinical psychosis symptoms. A significant association was found between 
non-clinical ‘PLEs’ and male gender, adverse experiences in childhood, lower 
education, unemployment, substance misuse and migration. Results which the 
authors comment on as notably similar to results of comparable meta-analytic 
studies of clinical psychosis (McGrath, Saha, Welham, Saadi, El, MacCauley & 
Chant, 2004). Again however, these reviews did not differentiate between types 
of experiences. 
 
A large-scale survey study, similar to the NEMESIS study, of 8580 participants 
was conducted in the UK by Johns et al (2004), using the UK National Survey of 
Psychiatric Morbidity to explore psychotic symptoms in the general population. 
Following a regression analysis of the data, symptoms of paranoia were found to 
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be more associated with average intelligence, alcohol dependency, younger age, 
and experiences of victimisation. Interestingly, in separating out experiences, 
paranoia was found to be associated with male gender, whilst hallucinatory 
experiences were more common in female participants. In a follow-up study, 
using a later version of the UK National Survey of Psychiatric Morbidity, 
conducted by Freeman et al (2011), non-clinical paranoia was investigated in 
7281 participants. Similar results were found to those in the Johns et al (2004) 
study, with paranoid thinking found to be associated with single marital status, 
poor health, poverty, lower age, lower intelligence, stress, low happiness, and 
lower perceived levels of social support. Interestingly, they also found that low 
levels of paranoia (as differentiated by the Psychosis Screening Questionnaire) 
were more associated with women, whilst high levels of paranoia were 
associated with men.  
 
When looked at overall, the research literature exploring ‘non-clinical’ symptoms 
of psychosis appear to show patterns in the associated factors and correlated 
demographic features. Factors related to lower socio-economic status and social 
disadvantage appear to be commonly correlated with non-clinical psychotic 
experiences, along with the perceived level of available social support and 
adverse childhood experiences (Kelleher & Cannon, 2011; Van Os, Linscott, 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 2009; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & 
Ravelli, 2000). Looking more specifically at paranoia, similar patterns can be 
seen related to socio-economic status and social disadvantage, as well as 
experiences of victimisation (Freeman, 2011; Johns, 2004). These factors are 
well-known and well-evidenced correlates with a wide variety of experiences of 
mental health distress and have been demonstrated to increase the risk of a 
range of potential forms of emotional distress and mental health diagnoses 
(Harper, 2011; Longden, & Read, 2016; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015). 
 
In terms of gender, an interesting pattern is demonstrated in which studies 
appear conflicted between suggesting more women are affected by experiences 
(van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000), and others suggesting more men are 
(Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & Krabbendam, 2009). However, 
when looking at non-clinical experiences of paranoia specifically, there appears 
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to be more of a consensus towards more men reporting the experience 
(Freeman, 2011; Johns, 2004). Given this interesting pattern, the present thesis 
aims to take a closer look at this association, and further explore the apparent 
relationship between gender and experiences of paranoia. 
 
1.5. Gender differences in clinical populations 
 
Explorations of potential gender differences in experiences of mental health 
difficulties have a long history in psychiatric and psychological research, along 
with hypothesising and theorising about the causes or reasons for these 
(Rosenfield & Mouzon, 2013). As a result of the well-established difference in 
rates of schizophrenia diagnoses between genders, with on average 60% of 
patients being male (McGrath, Saha, Chant & Welham, 2008), differences 
between men and women’s experiences have been extensively researched in 
clinical population psychosis and schizophrenia studies. However, this type of 
research is limited in non-clinical populations, or for paranoia specifically, beyond 
the incident rate research outlined in the previous section. This section of the 
chapter will therefore aim to offer a brief review of the literature available that 
further explores gender differences in clinical populations, as a way of gaining 
insight into the factors that may also contribute to differences at the more ‘lower 
end’ of the continuum. Again however, it is important to note the limiting nature of 
the use of these constructs (Read, 2013). 
 
Reviews of the literature have found that in addition to receiving more diagnoses 
than women, males demonstrated earlier onset of psychosis, worse premorbid 
functioning (Falkenburg & Tracy, 2014; Leung & Chue, 2000), and more severe 
symptomatology at initial presentation to services (Marvin, Rosen, Reilly, Solari, 
& Sweeney, 2007). These well replicated findings of differences at onset has led 
to significant amounts of research considering gender differences in first episode 
psychosis. In a meta-analytic study of twenty-seven papers, conducted by 
Cascio, Cella, Preti, Meneghelli, and Cocchi (2012), differences in experiences in 
patients with a first episode of psychosis were explored. Males were found to be 
much more prevalent and on average presented to services at a significantly 
younger age (25.4 years compared with 27.5 years).  
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Differences have also been found between males and females in the types of 
experiences affecting patients diagnosed with psychosis. Rietschel et al (2015), 
interviewed 239 patients considered at high risk of psychosis. They found that 
male participant’s experienced more pronounced negative symptoms, and higher 
rates of substance abuse disorders, as well as more severe deficits in social 
functioning, when compared to female interviewees. A finding also replicated in 
those experiencing symptoms, but not yet considered eligible for a diagnosis 
(Willhite, Niendam, Bearden, Zinberg, O'Brien & Cannon, 2008). In similar study 
conducted by Køster, Lajer, Lindhardt and Rosenbaum (2008) using a sample of 
269 participants drawn from the Danish National Schizophrenia Project, women 
were found to present with significantly more affective symptoms, whilst men 
experienced more of the negative symptoms of psychosis, a finding commonly 
reported in other similar studies (Falkenburg & Tracy, 2014; Leung & Chue, 
2000). 
 
In addition to differences in the types of experiences, trends have also been 
found related to the impact of experiences on wellbeing. In a study conducted by 
Cotton et al (2009), a sample of 661 patients from an early intervention service in 
Melbourne, Australia. Males were found to be more likely to have a substance 
misuse disorder, more severe psychopathology (Clinical Global Impressions 
Severity of Illness Scale), lower levels of social functioning, higher 
unemployment, and higher ‘treatment non-compliance’. In contrast, female 
patients were found to have a greater history of suicide attempts and depression, 
and presented with more depressive symptoms. Morgan, Chase and Jablensky 
(2008) randomly selected a sample of 1090 cases of schizophrenia, from a 
population sample of 1.1 million people as, part of the Australian Study of Low 
Prevalence Psychotic Disorders. Results demonstrated that women reported a 
less severe impact on interpersonal relationships and general social 
engagement, as well as a lower level of overall disability. 
 
Amongst the clinical population, differences have also been explored in recovery 
from a diagnosis of psychosis. Thorup et al (2014), conducted a study in which 
578 patients with first episode psychosis were included in a Danish trial early-
intervention programme. Results from the study showed that female participants 
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had a greater level of social functioning (employment, education and 
relationships) at follow-up, when compared with males. Female participants were 
also more likely to have reached a better state of recovery, whilst males were 
more likely to live alone, and have greater substance misuse problems. A similar 
study reviewing the experiences of 700 patients treated by a first-episode 
psychosis treatment programme in Hong Kong, found that women were more 
likely to achieve a higher level of recovery, with greater levels of social 
functioning following treatment, and better levels of employment prospects 
(Chang et al, 2011). 
 
Looking at gender differences specifically in delusional experiences, de Portugal, 
González, Vilaplana, Haro, Usall and Cervilla (2010) compared experiences in a 
sample of 106 individuals diagnosed with a delusional disorder, randomly 
selected from patients in five community mental health centres in Spain. In this 
study, it was found that women out numbered men on diagnoses of delusional 
disorder 1.6:1. However men were found to experience a greater severity of 
psychotic symptoms (Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale for Schizophrenia), 
specifically hallucinations, blunted affect, and emotional withdrawal, when 
compared to women. In addition, men were again found to experience a greater 
impact on general and social functioning, compared with women in the sample. 
 
The above brief review of available literatures demonstrates the presence of 
some interesting gender differences in men and women diagnosed with a 
‘psychotic disorder’. When compared with women, men appear to experience 
symptoms and present at services earlier, to be more prone to ‘negative’ 
symptoms of schizophrenia, suffer a greater degree of impact on wellbeing, and 
have a worse prognosis in terms of recovery and social functioning. However, on 
review these results can be critiqued for demonstrating only small differences, or 
for the conflicted nature of findings between studies (Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, Labad 
& Kulkarni, 2012). Additionally, these studies are limited by their use of the 
construct of ‘psychosis’ and ‘delusion’, which can be considered flawed in the 
ways previously outlined in the earlier section of this chapter. Therefore, in terms 
of paranoia, no firm conclusions can be drawn, due to the lack of research 
specifically differentiating between experiences. 
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1.6. Explanations of male paranoia 
 
Following on from the various explorations of gender differences in ‘clinical’ 
psychosis experiences outlined above, ideas for theoretical explanations have 
been proposed from biological, psychological and social perspectives 
(Falkenburg & Tracy, 2014). Whilst the predominant focus of these studies again 
is on the wider construct of psychosis, they can be theorised to offer an insight 
into possible explanations of the differences in experiences across the continuum 
of psychosis, and in the more specific experience of paranoia. Therefore, this 
section will offer a brief review of this literature. 
 
One of the more primarily biological explanations given for gender differences in 
psychosis, surrounds the hypothesis that the sex hormone oestrogen is 
protective for women (Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, Labad, & Kulkarni, 2012; Falkenburg 
& Tracy, 2014). Evidence for this theory has primarily come from trends 
demonstrating that more women than men experience psychosis symptoms at a 
post-menopausal age. The hypothesis being that this difference may be 
accounted for by the reduced level of oestrogen in women post-menopause 
(Häfner et al, 1998). These ideas have led to trials of sex hormone treatments for 
schizophrenia, with mostly inconclusive evidence (da Silva & Ravindran, 2015), 
but some evidence of symptom reduction in women but not in men (Begemann, 
Dekker, van Lunenburg, & Sommer, 2012). 
 
An alternative to this purely biological explanation relates to psychological 
experiences of trauma and adverse childhood experiences. Some evidence has 
appeared to suggest that women require a combination of more individual risk 
factors, in order to develop psychosis, when compared with men. Possibly 
indicating a reason for less women receiving a diagnosis (Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, 
Labad, & Kulkarni, 2012). Conversely, it has been hypothesised that women’s 
experiences may be more linked to childhood trauma and adverse childhood 
experiences than men’s, leading to potentially different expression of symptoms. 
This has had limited support from evidence that women with a diagnosis of 
psychosis are twice as likely to report adverse childhood experiences than men 
(Fisher et al, 2009). However, these results are highly likely to be confounded by 
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the well-evidenced phenomena of men being significantly less likely to self-report 
traumatic experiences than women (O'Leary & Barber, 2008; Alaggia, 2005). 
 
Proposed theories with more consideration of potential social factors have largely 
been inferred from examining trends of differences in levels of social support and 
social engagement. The apparent higher age of onset in women has been 
hypothesised as possibly protective for women, allowing for better social 
adjustment prior to the experiencing of symptoms (Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, Labad, & 
Kulkarni, 2012). In addition to this, evidence that women are more likely to be 
better socially integrated when compared with men, has been suggested to 
provide them with higher quality relationships and better familial support, 
potentially offsetting the negative impact of symptoms (Chang et al, 2011; 
Morgan, Castle & Jablensky, 2008; Preston, Orr, Date, Nolan & Castle, 2002). 
Jablensky and Cole (1997) propose that the apparent later age of onset for 
women, may be a result of the protective nature of long-term relationships and 
marriage, absent for many men diagnosed with psychosis. Additionally, more 
social support for women has been proposed as an explanation for higher 
incidence rates in men, due to a hypothesised greater degree of ‘covering up’ of 
women’s symptoms within families (Scully et al, 2002). 
 
Another area of focus for potential explanations surrounds differences in men and 
women’s approach to help seeking. A particular focus has been given to the 
apparent trend that men have a longer duration of untreated psychosis (DUP) 
when compared with women, hypothesised to lead to the increase in the severity 
and impact of negative symptoms, and a greater overall impact on life and 
wellbeing (Chang et al, 2011). In addition to presenting for help later, evidence 
suggests that substance misuse is greater in men who experience psychosis 
symptoms, when compared with women experiencing similar difficulties. (Chang 
et al, 2011), leading to the hypothesis that this may reducing coping, levels of 
support, and increase intensity of both positive and negative symptoms (Arranz et 
al, 2015). 
 
When considering causes of male paranoia, it is important to also draw attention 
to the evidence of increased rates of paranoia among black and ethnic minority 
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men receiving treatment in mental health services, when compared to their white 
peers (Whaley, 2004a; Whaley, 2004b). In addition to inpatient settings, trends of 
increased paranoia have been identified in non-clinical settings, amongst men 
who identified as black or bi-racial, linked to adverse life experiences and 
discrimination, as well as living in oppressive and racist contexts. (Mosley, Owen, 
Rostosky & Reese, 2016). Whaley (2004a) conducted a study on 116 black men 
of African descent, admitted for treatment at a state psychiatric inpatient unit in 
the U.S. They found that at the more ‘mild’ end of the paranoia continuum, 
significant elements of paranoia experiences correlated with levels of cultural 
mistrust, leading to hypotheses that the experiences of these men were related to 
negative associations with authority and experiences of state discrimination. 
Whaley (2004b) conducted a secondary analysis on data from 180 men from the 
general population who took part in an epidemiological study of risk factors for 
schizophrenia and depression. Results showed that black men with a level of 
paranoia at the ‘mild’ end of the continuum, were less likely to seek help from 
services that their white counterparts, further demonstrating the potential effects 
of mistrust. It has been theorised that experiences of paranoia in black men is of 
particular importance, due to the effects of justifiable or ‘healthy paranoia’ as a 
direct result of experiences of discrimination and racism (Sue, Capodilupo, & 
Holder, 2008).  
 
Moving away from research focusing on gender differences in psychosis and 
schizophrenia, comparatively little attention has been given to explaining gender 
differences in nonclinical experiences of paranoia, and the apparent trend of 
increased prevalence in men. In order to hypothesise around potential 
mechanisms behind these differences, it is useful to briefly explore research 
surrounding men’s psychological wellbeing in broader terms. 
 
The potential impact of masculine norms on men’s experiences of psychological 
distress has been extensively researched over the years. Some earlier attempts 
to theorise have focused on the socialisation of gender roles, hypothesising that 
male socialisation of detachment from emotions and high independence might 
foster a vulnerability to paranoia (Lewis, 1985). A strong adherence to perceived 
masculine norms such as emotional control has been linked to poorer mental 
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health (Burns, & Mahalik, 2006; Wong, Ho, Wang & Miller, 2017), increased 
psychological distress and aggression (Mahalik et al, 2003), experiences of 
depression in unemployment (Syzdek, & Addis, 2010), and is negatively 
associated with psychological help seeking (Wong, Ho, Wang & Miller, 2017). 
Research based on the ‘Gender Role Strain’ paradigm hypothesises that it is the 
degree of conflict between perceived masculine norms and own perception of 
achievement of those standards, that causes strain, conflict and increased 
psychological distress (Pleck, 1995). Level of gender role strain has been 
demonstrated to correlate with experiences of psychological distress in broader 
terms (Blazina & Watkins, 1996), as well as with experiences of paranoid thinking 
in men (Good, Robertson, Fitzgerald, Stevens & Bartels, 1996). However, these 
results do not appear to be universal. In a study conducted by Good, Heppner, 
DeBord and Fischer (2004), only 1% of the variance in men’s psychological 
distress (from a sample of 260 male college students) could be accounted for by 
results on a measure of masculine gender role strain. 
 
In summary, as a result of the evidence demonstrating a higher rate of psychosis 
diagnoses in men, extensive research has been conducted attempting to offer 
explanations. A variety of ideas have been hypothesised, including sex 
hormones, social support, help seeking, trauma, and racism and discrimination, 
as well as the broader impact of ‘masculine’ gender norms, with varying degrees 
of relevance and success. Again, this literature is open to critiques related to the 
use of constructs such as ‘psychosis’, and therefore offers only a limited amount 
of information related to the specific experience of paranoia. In addition, the body 
of research presented takes a very essentialised and non-critical or taken-for 
granted view of ‘gender’, failing to account for the socially-constructed nature of 
the term (Wodak, 1997). The next section of this chapter proposes that taking a 
qualitative and discursive approach to research could therefore offer a more 
useful perspective in this area. 
 
1.7. Discursive approaches 
 
So far, the literature reviewed in this chapter has presented research that takes a 
predominantly quantitative and reductive approach in exploring experiences of 
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paranoia and the role of gender. The following section will now propose 
arguments against purely researching these experiences in this manner, 
proposing that a qualitative and discursive approach will allow an investigation of 
the interrelatedness of gender and paranoia in a more socially contextualised 
manner. 
 
1.7.1. Discursive approaches towards paranoia 
 
In considering the reasoning for taking an alternative and more discursive 
approach to this research, it is important to return to and expand upon some of 
the arguments made earlier in this chapter. Beyond issues with the medical 
model taking a purely categorical approach to understanding paranoia, Harper 
(1996) highlights how the more medical definitions of paranoia individualise 
experiences of suspicion, constructing the phenomena as a form of disorder 
located within the individual. This process of individualisation has been criticised 
for leading to a disregarding of the impact of social context on experiences of 
paranoia (Cromby and Harper, 2009). Mary Boyle (2002) critiques the role of 
research in his process, describing how “Researchers de-emphasise the role of 
social context in ‘delusions’ in several ways, including providing little or no 
information on participants’ backgrounds or circumstances and by using ‘neutral’ 
tasks which are not specifically related to the person’s belief systems”.  
 
As well as ignoring the role of context, reductive and quantitative approaches to 
paranoia have been critiqued for ignoring the inherently social nature of the 
judgment of plausibility of beliefs (Harper 1996). This is most apparent in the way 
in which definitions within the DSM-V point to comparisons with “conflicting 
evidence”, and for the experience to be “unfounded” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). In this way paranoia is constructed as something whereupon 
the individual is compared with the ‘normal’ consensus within society, thus 
inherently a social process (Harper, 1996). In addition, the diagnosis or 
judgement of a delusional belief by professionals has been shown to rarely be 
based on evaluations against evidence, relying instead upon ‘common sense’, 
and judgements of plausibility (Maher, 1992). Again, pointing more to a social 
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and dialogical process, between individuals, as opposed to a process of empirical 
evaluation.  
 
May and Kelly (1992) advocate the taking of a more social approach to 
understanding experiences of paranoia. They describe how it is revealed almost 
entirely in talk, is at a certain degree reasonably viewable as a functional part of 
everyday life, and is inherently relational in nature as “a desperate, and ultimately 
destructive, attempt to protect self from the consequences of a public identity at 
odds with self-image”. Viewing paranoia in relational and social terms, highlights 
how judgment of beliefs as ‘paranoid’ or ‘delusional’ occurs as an interactional 
process, as a judgement made by an other, and not as a direct comparison with a 
reality (Heise, 1988). Georgaca (2000) has further considered the social process 
of judgement of beliefs, stating that “The establishment of truth is an inter-
subjective achievement which entails processes of validation, negotiation and 
persuasion in specific inter-subjective, social and cultural contexts”, and pointing 
to the need for a discursive approach to research in this area. Taking a more 
discursive approach, can be said to allow for considerations of the processes by 
which a belief is determined plausible, and ‘factualisation’ occurs, as well as why 
in ‘paranoid’ beliefs, this process breaks down (Georgaca, 2004). 
 
Overall, these critiques point towards a need for research to turn away from 
considering individual dysfunction, and move towards more consideration and 
incorporation of the social context from within which these types of distress are 
experienced, and the interactional processes in which they are judged and 
formed (Cromby & Harper, 2009). A discursive approach to research, considers 
the role of language in constructing social reality, and therefore provides a critical 
perspective on more ‘cognitivist’ forms of psychology (Willig, 2013). In this way, 
social context, discourse and individual experiences are considered intrinsically 
linked (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). Psychological phenomena such as paranoia can 
therefore be considered as “discursive actions rather than cognitive processes” 
(Willig, 2013). In considering this approach to paranoia, Harper (1996) argues 
that it allows for the consideration of social and individual factors not as separate, 
but as intrinsically linked. This creates a perspective wherein the role of dominant 
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discourses in society and the ‘positioning’ of others as ‘paranoid’ can be 
unpicked. 
 
In addition to allowing for a deconstruction of paranoia in context, it can be 
argued that taking a more discursive approach to researching paranoia and 
delusional beliefs can address the earlier made criticism that conventional 
approaches rely upon a naïve realist view of the world (Harper, 2004; Harper, 
1996). In utilising discursive approaches, we can consider multiple perspectives 
and the constructed and co-constructed nature of ‘reality’ (Harper, 1996; Wiggins 
& Potter, 2008). As opposed to relying upon the limited perspective of attempting 
to separate a ‘false’ belief from one based in reality (Harper, 2004). This more 
critical perspective on the nature of reality also allows us to move towards 
focusing on the experiences of those whose paranoia has been pathologised or 
categorised through diagnosis, and consider the way in which experiences of 
paranoia are available to many through prevalent discourses (Harper, 1996). In 
this way a discursive approach provides a useful theoretical framework for 
investigating the phenomena in the broadest terms, without becoming fixed to 
either a ‘clinical’ or ‘non-clinical’ perspective. 
 
In a paper aiming to bring together many of these concepts Cromby and Harper 
(2009) propose a social account of the experience of paranoia. They argue that 
our inner experiences of ‘paranoid’ emotions and bodily sensations are co-
constituted with discourse in a simultaneous and moment-by-moment process of 
embodied subjectivity. In this way, the social and the individual cannot be 
separated from each other, as each influences and affects the other. Discursive 
approaches to understanding paranoia can therefore be useful in considering this 
process of co-constituted feeling (Cromby & Harper, 2009), as well as the way in 
which discourse positions people as ‘paranoid’ (Harper, 2004).  
 
1.7.2. Discursive approaches towards gender 
 
In addition to being able to address the many issues surrounding explorations of 
paranoia experiences, discursive approaches have also been proposed as a 
solution to potential issues in the study of gender. Connell (2005) critiques the 
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amount of ‘sex differences’ research that is conducted, pointing out that despite 
sometimes seeming to reveal interesting differences in individual studies, the vast 
majority of large scale meta-analytic results conclude little to no significant 
difference. He further points out that our own biases may culturally cue us to 
exaggerate the importance of these relatively small differences. In addition, the 
commonly used empirical approach to studying gender differences reduces 
gender to two differing constructs (male and female), and then studies the 
differences between the two, in purely quantitative or numerical terms. This 
approach has been critiqued for ignoring evidence that gender is more nuanced 
and varied, and the socially constructed nature of these categories (Carrera, 
DePalma & Lameiras, 2012). Butler (1999) critiques the notion of gender, for 
appearing ‘socially based’ but actually maintaining the concepts of a ‘male’ and 
‘female’ dichotomy. She goes on to deconstruct the fixed nature of these 
identities, and emphasises the socially constructed nature of both sex and 
gender.  
 
In response to some of the above arguments, it can be proposed that taking a 
more discursive approach to research, and viewing gender as a social construct, 
allows for a more nuanced and contextualised understanding (Wodak, 1997). 
Discursive approaches to gender have their origins in post-structuralist 
perspectives, and understand gender in terms of multiple, shifting, and often 
contradictory positions within discourse, that individuals take up (Mehta & Bondi, 
(1999). Through this approach, the aim is often to explore how discursive 
patterns maintain existing gender constructions, as well as divisions and 
structural inequalities in society, so that they can be better understood (Litosseliti, 
2014). In this way, there is an acknowledgment of a process of ‘doing gender’, 
where gender is understood to be acted and performed through behaviour and 
discourse, as opposed to being a more essentialised attribute possessed by 
individual people, by nature of their sex and biological attributes (Butler, 1999). 
 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, much of the research exploring men’s mental 
health has focused on the concepts of masculinity and gender roles (Pleck, 
1995). Wetherell and Edley (2014) argue strongly for a discursive approach to the 
study of men and masculinity, wherein masculinity is treated not as a something 
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of which its properties can or are to be revealed, but rather something that is 
being constructed. They argue that traditional research into the effects of 
masculinity, such as those utilising the gender role strain paradigm, risk treating 
masculinity as an essentialised property, thereby missing the multiple ways of 
constructing and ‘doing masculinity’. Similarly, use of measures that aim to 
assess levels of adherence to masculine norms (Mahalik, 2003), reify and 
decontextualize the construct as it is described, stripping any space for critical 
analysis (Connell, 2005; Wetherell and Edley, 2014). In this way, constraining our 
understanding of gender to defined traits or roles, limits the ability to understand 
the context in which this occurs, as well as the ways in which individuals move in 
and out of transgressing norms and the circumstances that allow for or restrict 
this from happening (Addis, Mansfield, & Syzdek, 2010). 
 
Connell (2005) emphasises the importance of considering intersectionality in 
masculinity research, whereby we can understand the different masculinities that 
are constructed in cultural settings, influenced by race, sexuality, class, culture, 
etc., as well as the dominance of ‘hegemony’ and oppression and marginalisation 
within masculinities (Hopkins & Noble, 2009; Connell 2005). Constructing men 
homogenously is potentially problematic in limiting the way we can explore how 
men experience their subjectivities, express and cope with distress, and how this 
relates to differing forms of gender discourse (Ridge, Emslie, & White, 2011). 
Intersectionality can be understood to be better accounted for in research utilising 
a more discursive approach, through the process of deconstructing single notions 
of gender and considering the multiple interplay with other constructs such as 
class, race, etc. (Litosselity, 2014). Additionally, it is then more possible to 
account for how the experience and subjectivity of men is changing, and the 
influence this has on psychological distress and mental health (Ridge, Emslie, & 
White, 2011) 
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1.8. The present study 
 
1.8.1. Rationale 
 
As outlined in this chapter so far, experiences of paranoia are common both 
within clinical and non-clinical populations (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 
2000). Therefore, further research into the experience of paranoia in non-clinical 
populations is important, in improving our understanding of the experiences 
across the board (Ellett & Wildschut, 2014; Freeman 2006). At the more general 
population ‘non-clinical’ end of the paranoia continuum, whilst there is some 
conflicting results, the overall trend appears to suggest that more men than 
women report paranoid experiences (Freeman, 2011; Johns, 2004). Research 
conducted so far aiming to explore gender differences in ‘psychotic’ experiences 
such as paranoia, have predominantly taken a more reductive and realist 
approach to both constructs. In this way, research can be critiqued for its reliance 
on unscientific diagnostic categories (Read, 2013), or when these are not used, 
for the decontextualising of experiences of paranoia (Cromby and Harper, 2009), 
and the reification of oversimplified notions of gender (Connell, 2005). In addition, 
purely focusing on numerical differences in the number of men or women 
reporting paranoia, gives little information about potential differences in how this 
is experienced. The taking of a qualitative and discursive approach may serve to 
address many of these issues (Willig, 2013), however discursive research 
exploring potential gender differences in experiences of distress is often lacking, 
with few studies exploring specific experiences (Ridge, Emslie, & White, 2011). 
 
The current study therefore aimed to investigate the apparent relationship 
between gender and paranoia, taking a discursive psychology approach to the 
research. It explored how concepts of ‘paranoid’ men and women are constructed 
and how these constructions draw from wider culturally available discourses of 
gender and paranoia. Adopting a discursive approach was hoped to limit the 
potential for reification of traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity, whilst 
allowing for consideration of more nuanced and varied discourses, as well as the 
presence of intersectionality with class, race, and culture. (Wetherell and Edley, 
2014). The study aimed to explore the experiences of both men and women, so 
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as not to risk reproducing notions of a dichotomous split in gender, through only 
investigating the experience of one ‘gender’ (Butler, 1999). The research was 
conducted utilising a student population due to the high prevalence of self-
reported paranoia found within this population (Ellett, Lopes & Chadwick, 2003) 
and the resultant increased chance of individuals having direct or indirect 
experiences of which to speak. 
 
It was hoped that further insights and understanding into the relationship between 
gender and paranoia could provide useful information for clinical practice. Within 
social constructionist approaches to therapy, such as systemic and narrative 
models, attention is paid to the storied nature of difficulties such as paranoia, how 
these constructions can arise, and how new stories can be co-constructed within 
the therapeutic relationship (Hedges, 2005). Having a greater understanding of 
the process in which discourse positions men and women as ‘paranoid’, could aid 
in this type of clinical work. Additionally, ideas drawn from this research was 
hoped to inform further studies and the development of psychological models of 
paranoia that can incorporate more consideration of the gendered nature of 
distress. 
 
1.8.2. Research Questions 
  
In light of the above aims, the current study aimed to address the following 
research questions; 
 
1. What are the culturally available discourses around ‘gender’ and 
‘paranoia’?, 
2. How do such discourses construct subjectivity and position paranoid men 
and women differently?, and 
3. What is the role of intersectionality, in impacting constructions of paranoid 
men and women? 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
 
Having reviewed existing literature, and presented the research aims and 
rationale, this chapter will now outline the overall epistemological, methodological 
and procedural approach adopted by the present study, as well as the reasoning 
behind these decisions. The chapter begins by addressing the process behind 
the selection of a qualitative approach and research epistemology, before moving 
on to consider subsequent decisions around methods, and the reasoning behind 
the decision to utilise a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) and individual 
interviews. The chapter will then move on to describing the procedures followed 
in recruitment, data collection, transcribing and analysis, before closing with a 
consideration of ethical and quality issues. 
 
2.2. Choosing a Research Paradigm 
 
In addressing the research questions outlined in the previous chapter, a 
qualitative research approach was taken. This approach was chosen in order to 
add to existing research literature in a way that addresses previously articulated 
concerns with more reductive and empiricist approaches towards investigating 
‘paranoia’ (Harper, 2004) and ‘gender’ (Wetherell & Edley, 2014). Whilst a 
qualitative approach broadly enables an exploratory focus to research, there are 
enormous variations in epistemological foundations and methodologies, each 
useful for different types of research questions and data collection (Howitt, 2016).  
 
Willig (2013) provides a useful description of the process behind which qualitative 
research projects should be developed. She outlines how research questions 
make important assumptions about knowledge, in terms of both what can be 
known, and how that knowledge can be approached. Therefore, it is necessary 
for researchers to consider what epistemological orientation best addresses their 
research questions, before moving through to the methodological and procedural 
designs that follow this decision. The following sections of this chapter will 
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therefore aim to describe the research paradigm utilised as a framework for the 
present study, whilst explaining the rationale behind these specific choices. 
 
2.2.1. Epistemology 
 
In asking what kind or type of knowledge is to be sought, we ask questions of 
epistemology or “what can be known and how?” (Willig, 2013). Harper (2012) 
described how this question is important in differentiating between different 
epistemological positions, which each inform the type of assumptions about 
knowledge that can be made, and then subsequently frame a study’s 
methodology. He follows the work of Willig (2013) by outlining three main 
epistemological frameworks, realism, phenomenology, and social 
constructionism, each of which make differing claims about the nature of 
knowledge.  
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the research questions for the present study 
were; 
1. What are the culturally available discourses around ‘gender’ and 
‘paranoia’?, 
2. How do such discourses construct subjectivity and position paranoid men 
and women differently?, and 
3. What is the role of intersectionality, in impacting constructions of paranoid 
men and women? 
 
In order for an approach best suited to addressing the above research questions, 
a moderate social constructionist or critical realist social constructionist 
epistemology was chosen (Harper, 2012). A social constructionist 
epistemological framework takes a critical approach towards taken for granted 
knowledge, challenging the assumptions of reductive science (Burr, 2003). In this 
way, social constructionism considers how knowledge is generated and 
constructed, placing an emphasis on the discursive and social processes within 
which this occurs (Harper, 2012). Social constructionist research can vary 
between what has been termed the radical approach, and a more moderate 
viewpoint (Harper, 2012). At the more radical and relativist end, reality and 
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knowledge are viewed as entirely constructed through discourse. Therefore, a 
socially constructed reality cannot ‘survive’ beyond a specific context and make 
claims or inform us about a differing context, a position many feel makes 
research untenable (Willig, 2013). In contrast, at the more moderate or critical 
realist end of social constructionist epistemology there is often the aim of making 
connections between discursive constructions in a specific instance, and the 
wider social-cultural context in which this takes place (Willig, 2013). Taking this 
approach allows for an understanding that any ‘reality’ is made sense of through 
discursive construction and processes (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999), whilst also 
considering the pre-existence of material structures and practices, such as 
cultural and political power, that can influence discourse (Harper, 2012),  
 
In taking this approach within the present study, the wider socio-cultural and 
political contexts can be considered in which gender and mental health discourse 
occurs, as opposed to a focus purely on one specific example of constructed 
reality (Willig, 2013). Additionally, taking this position allowed for an exploration of 
the role of discourse in forming gendered identities and creating ‘subject 
positions’ (Burr, 2003), acknowledging that there are multiple ways of “doing 
gender” (Wetherall & Edley, 2014) or of being positioned as ‘paranoid’, that 
create or limit possibilities for experiences and actions (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008). 
 
2.2.2. Methodology 
 
Following on from decisions related to epistemology, qualitative researchers 
should consider the methodological and analytic strategies that both fit within this 
framework and allow for the generation of knowledge that best addresses the 
research questions (Willig, 2013). In the present study, Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis (FDA) was chosen as the methodological approach. This section will 
aim to both conceptualise FDA and provide a rationale for the choice of this 
approach. 
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2.2.2.1. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) 
Like other forms of discourse analysis, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis is 
interested in the role of language in constructing the social world, however it goes 
beyond interpersonal communication to consider the relationship between 
discourse, subjectivity, and practice (Willig, 2013). Parker (1992) defines 
discourse as “a system of statements which constructs an object”, the ‘object’ 
therefore being any noun or ‘something’ given a reality through its description. He 
goes on to describe how discourses do not just describe the social world, but 
construct and categorise it, along with the ‘subjects’ or individuals that inhabit the 
world and, in turn re-produce it through their own discursive ‘talk’. Foucault 
conceptualised discourse as the objects, rules, and systems within a whole body 
of knowledge, such as medicine (Arribas-Ayllon, & Walkerdine, 2008). He 
considered discursive processes as creating ‘subject positions’ which if taken up 
have implications for an individual’s experience or ‘subjectivity’ (Willig, 2013). He 
drew inherent links between this process and the practice of power, elucidating 
how there lies an inherent link between power and discourse, through the 
creating of possible positions of subjectivity and subsequent available ways of 
being and acting (Arribas-Ayllon, & Walkerdine, 2008). Parker (1992) gives the 
helpful example of the medical discourse, a body of knowledge and practices in 
which the subject positions of ‘patient’ and ‘doctor’ are created. As a ‘patient’ we 
are positioned in relation to power and therefore limited in what we can know, 
have the authority to speak about, and do. 
 
Willig (2013) describes how, as an analytic method, Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis aims to analyse the way in which a discursive object is constructed, 
along with the variety of wider socio-cultural discourses that are drawn upon and 
inform this process. Following this, there can be a consideration of how these 
constructions are deployed by individuals in talk, and how discourses create 
positions for subjects to ‘take up’ or be positioned into, as well as the subsequent 
impact this process has on an individual’s experiences or subjectivity (van 
Langenhove & Harre, 1999). These concepts will be expanded upon later in this 
chapter, when the process of an FDA is outlined. 
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2.2.2.2. FDA and the Present Study 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) was identified as the most appropriate 
methodological approach for this study, due to its usefulness in answering 
questions related to the discursive construction of subjects and objects such as 
paranoia and gender. Other methods were considered, but rejected based on 
their limited ability to address the research questions of the present study. For 
example, whilst interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) would allow for 
an exploration of individual’s subjective experiences of paranoia, it would not 
account for the constructive nature of language, nor allow for an exploration of 
the wider discursive constructs and their impact on individuals’ accounts of 
experiences (Willig, 2013). Similarly, whilst use of Discourse Analysis might allow 
for exploration of the constructive nature of language and the role of discourse, it 
would not allow for a consideration of the potential impact on subjectivity and the 
experience of those labelled paranoid (Willig, 2013). Hollway (1998) describes 
how femininity and masculinity cannot be considered as fixed features located in 
men and women, but are the products of prevalent gender discourses, and are 
re-produced through gendered subjectivity and practice. Therefore, utilising FDA 
in the present study will allow for both an exploration of prevalent gender and 
paranoia discourses, as well as a consideration for how these might intersect, 
and the resultant impact on experience or subjectivity of those positioned as a 
‘paranoid man’ or ‘paranoid woman’. 
 
2.3. Method and Procedure 
 
Having outlined the overall research paradigm utilised in the present study, this 
section will focus on the method and procedures used throughout data collection 
and analysis. 
 
2.3.1. Recruitment and Participant Criteria 
 
2.3.1.1. Participant Criteria 
Participants were recruited from the student population at the University of East 
London. A student population was utilised due to the high prevalence of self-
reported paranoia found within this population (Ellett, Lopes & Chadwick, 2003) 
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and the resultant increased chance of individuals having direct or indirect 
experiences about which they could speak. Due to the research interest in the 
culturally available discourses of gender, and the consequential effects for both 
women and men, participants of any gender identity were sought for participation 
in interviews. 
 
The final criteria for participants in the present study were therefore as follows: 
- to be able to communicate in English. 
- to be a current student at the University of East London. and, 
- to be aged 18 or over. 
 
2.3.1.2. Recruitment Strategy 
Participants were recruited using convenience sampling at the University of East 
London, through several means. Recruitment posters were displayed and leaflets 
handed out at different locations around the university campus, containing 
information about the study and the researcher’s contact details. In addition, 
requests for participants were posted on several University of East London social 
networking groups, and sent out to all students in the School of Psychology.  
 
The research aimed to recruit between eight and twelve individuals, with roughly 
equal numbers of male and females. Concepts of data saturation have been 
critiqued as difficult to operationalise, and inappropriate for time-limited post-
graduate study (Mason, 2010). However, this number of participants was felt to 
be appropriate, offering a balance between answering the research questions, 
and the limits placed on time for interviewing, transcription and analysis, in 
professional doctorate study (Baker & Edwards, 2012). 
 
2.3.1.3. Participants 
Across the recruitment period, twenty potential participants contacted the 
researcher about taking part in the study, nine females and eleven males. 
Following this initial contact, three of the female and four of the male applicants 
did not respond to subsequent requests to arrange an interview. Of those 
interviews subsequently scheduled, four of the male participants did not attend 
their arranged interviews, and did not respond to subsequent contacts. The 
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recording of one interview with a female participant was lost, due to a faulty 
Dictaphone. Therefore, the final sample of interviews was made up of six female 
and three male participants. The mean age for participants was 29, with a range 
of 22; the youngest was 18, and the eldest 40. Table one describes the final 
interview sample, with assigned pseudonyms and approximate ages, in order to 
preserve anonymity.  
 
Table 1.  
Demographics of final interview sample. 
Pseudonym Approximate 
Age 
Gender Self-Identified 
Ethnicity 
Area of Study 
Adila 40 F Mixed 
Undergraduate 
Psychology 
Sofia 40 F Spanish 
Post-Graduate 
Psychology 
Sandra 20 F Black British 
Undergraduate 
Psychology 
Lien 25 F 
British 
Vietnamese 
Undergraduate 
Psychology 
Carlos 20 M White Brazilian 
Undergraduate 
Psychology 
Bilal 30 M British Mixed 
Post-Graduate 
Psychology 
Simon 30 M White British 
Undergraduate 
Psychology 
Amy 25 F White British 
Post-Graduate 
Psychology 
Becky 30 F White British 
Undergraduate 
Psychology 
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2.3.2. Data Collection 
 
2.3.2.1. Interviews 
Data was collected through the use of individual semi-structured interviews. This 
method was chosen due to the need for a flexible approach in which the 
researcher could follow up on interesting ideas or concepts raised by the 
participants (Smith, 1995). Interviews were carried out in research and library 
study rooms at the University of East London. Each interview lasted between 52 
and 66 minutes, and was recorded through the use of a Dictaphone owned by the 
researcher. Interviews followed the structure of an interview schedule (Appendix 
A). The interview schedule aimed to broadly follow a ‘funnelling’ approach (Smith, 
1995), in which the general topic of paranoia and any relevant experiences were 
explored, before moving on to asking about more specific examples. At the early 
part of each interview, after initial open reflections about the topic, there was a 
discussion around the definition of paranoia posed by Cromby and Harper 
(2009); that paranoia is “a way of perceiving and relating to other people and to 
the world that is characterized by some degree of suspicion, mistrust or hostility”. 
This was utilised as a way of orienting to the topic and broadening ideas beyond 
purely clinical or mental health constructs (Howitt, 2016). A vignette was utilised 
towards the end of each interview, describing a young man experiencing 
paranoia, to gain participants’ perspectives related to the experiences of another 
person (Appendix B). Following this, the researcher asked how the interviewees 
would feel about the vignette if it described a young woman, or someone of a 
different ethnicity, as a way gaining information related to the impact of 
intersectionality. 
 
2.3.2.2. Transcription 
Recordings of interviews were transcribed according to a word for word 
transcription method (Banister et al, 2011 pp. 49-69). This level of transcription 
was deemed appropriate as a greater level of detail (such as may be used for 
Conversation Analysis) was not required. All transcription was undertaken by the 
author. All personally identifiable information was altered to ensure anonymity, 
and pseudonyms were provided for all participants. 
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2.3.3. Analysis 
 
Willig (2013) and Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) provide guidance on the 
process of conducting a Foucaldian Discourse Analysis in qualitative research 
projects, although both acknowledge that no formalised process exists. Before 
outlining the analytic procedure utilised in the present study, it is important to 
define some of the important terminology used. 
 
 Discourse – As outlined earlier, discourse can be defined as any “system 
of statements which constructs an object” (Parker, 1992). This ‘object’ can 
therefore be any ‘something’ that is given a reality through its description. 
Discursive objects can be constructed in multiple different and often 
conflicting ways, dependent upon the broader discourses that are drawn 
upon (Willig, 2013). 
 Subject Position – Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2008) state that 
“discourses do not only constitute objects in various and, sometimes, 
contradictory ways, but they also offer positions from which a person may 
speak the truth about objects”. Different discourses therefore provide a 
variety of subject positions for individuals or ‘subjects’ to take up, each 
with limitations in terms of ways of speaking and acting (Willig, 2013). The 
positioning of self and others, within discourse, can be understood as “a 
dynamic alternative to the more static concept of role”, in acknowledging 
that positions are created through discourse, as opposed to existing in a 
more fixed manner (van Langenhove & Harre, 1999). 
 Practice and Subjectivity - As outlined by Willig (2013), practice concerns 
the way in which the discursive constructions and subject positions ‘open 
up’ and ‘close down’ opportunities for action, and limit or constrain what 
can be said and done. In turn, subjectivities are the subsequent 
consequences for individual subjective experience, and therefore the 
result of being positioned in these ways. Foucault linked this process with 
the practice of power, through describing how individuals or ‘subjects’ are 
produced within discourse, and therefore have limited or constrained 
agency (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). 
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In providing a structure for analysis of the data collected in the present study, 
Willig’s (2013, p.131) six stage procedure for Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
was followed. Those stages are; 
 
1. Discursive Constructions: Identify the different ways in which key 
discursive objects are constructed, utilising both explicit and implicit 
references. In the case of the present study, these would be any ways in 
which ‘paranoia’ or ‘male’ or ‘female’ etc. are constructed. 
2. Discourses: Highlight the differences between constructions of each 
discursive object, whilst locating these within wider discourses.  
3. Action Orientation: Examine the discursive context within which different 
constructions of the object are deployed, along with their possible 
functions or ‘action orientation’. E.g. what is gained by constructing the 
object in that particular way, at that particular point? 
4. Positionings: Identify the different subject positions offered by the varying 
constructions of the object. 
5. Practice: Explore the ways in which the discursive constructions and 
subject positions open up or close down opportunities for action. How do 
discourses limit what can be said and done? 
6. Subjectivity: Explore the consequences of taking up a subject position, in 
terms of individuals’ subjective experiences. What is the relationship with 
subjectivity and the available ways of seeing, experiencing and being 
within the world? 
 
Prior to following these stages, interview recordings were re-listened to, and the 
transcripts of interviews were read several times. This allowed for the accuracy of 
transcripts to be checked, whilst also allowing for familiarisation with the data. 
During this initial phase, notes were taken regarding initial thoughts and themes 
related to the data. Following these initial readings, transcripts were coded 
following the first of the stages, focusing on the varying ways in which paranoia 
and gender were constructed during talk. Key recurring constructions were then 
highlighted and mapped out, according to their varying associations and 
contradictions with other constructions.  
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At this stage, a meeting was held with the thesis supervisor, in order to discuss 
the analytic process. During this meeting, quotations and transcripts were 
reviewed, in order to explore ideas related to initial discursive themes, and a 
potential structure for the final analysis. Following this meeting each discursive 
construction was further analysed utilising the rest of the six stages. These more 
detailed ideas were then also shared with the supervisor, in order to receive 
feedback regarding the rigour and credibility of the analysis, as well as feedback 
on the type of interpretations made. Finally, in bringing together the data, the 
research questions were utilised as a way of managing and framing the analysis. 
This provided a structure to thinking, and maintained relevance to the study, 
preventing the analysis from becoming simply a list of each possible discursive 
feature. Following this process of structuring, the analysis report was written, 
utilising illustrative quotes and extracts throughout. This allowed for clarification of 
ideas, and a presentation of their relationship with the data, in way that 
addressed research questions. 
 
2.4. Ethical Considerations 
 
2.4.1. Ethical Approval 
 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the School of Psychology 
Research Ethics Sub-Committee at the University of East London (Appendix C). 
No other ethical approval was deemed necessary, as participants were recruited 
from a non-clinical population. As interview discussions were not oriented 
towards individual participants’ own experiences, it was not anticipated that 
participants would find participation difficult or distressing.  
 
2.4.2. Informed Consent 
 
In order to gain informed consent, participants were required to read an 
information sheet (Appendix D), and then to sign a consent form (Appendix E). 
These forms outlined the purpose of the study, structure and content of the 
interviews, and participants’ right to withdraw. Participants were informed that 
they were able to withdraw from interviews at any time and could request the 
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removal of their contributions, up until the point at which analysis began in March 
2017. Following completion of the interviews, participants were debriefed and 
supplied with a debrief form detailing organisations from which they could seek 
support if required (Appendix F). Additionally, participants were reminded of their 
right to withdraw from the study. No participants requested for this to happen. 
 
2.4.3. Confidentiality 
 
In order to maintain confidentiality, participants’ individual contributions to 
interviews were coded using pseudonyms in all transcriptions, analysis and 
interpretation, as well as throughout the report. All recordings will be erased upon 
completion of the thesis and viva examination, however anonymised transcripts 
were retained for further analysis and for the purposes of future publication. 
 
2.5. Evaluating Quality 
 
The evaluation of quality in all research is important, and qualitative research is 
no exception to this (Spencer and Ritchie, 2012). Madill, Jordan and Shirey 
(2000) state that to a greater extent than in quantitative research, qualitative 
research evaluation is influenced by the differing epistemological positions that 
can be taken up. Therefore, they argue that qualitative researchers should 
consider this, and specify their evaluative criteria. Spencer and Ritchie (2012) 
provide a useful set of guiding principles in the quality evaluation of qualitative 
research, which consider the role of epistemology, as well as the nature of this 
type of research. Those principles are: 
 
 Contribution: To what extent does the research contribute to theory, policy, 
practice, methodological development, or the lives of individuals? Whether 
qualitative research can do this remains contested, however Spencer and 
Richie (2012) point to the ability of qualitative research to develop new 
hypotheses, and expand understanding of discursive processes and 
phenomenological experiences. 
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 Credibility: To what extent are the claims made by the research defensible 
and plausible? Does the research demonstrate a level of interpretive, and 
methodological validity? Has the process of interpretation been adequately 
presented, and are claims made by the researcher backed up by 
appropriate evidence? Readers of the project should be able to follow the 
thinking of the researcher, in order to evaluate the methods used in the 
generating of interpretations, and presenting of wider research claims. 
 Rigour: Has the research been conducted and presented in such a way as 
to demonstrate a level of methodological validity and reliability? Whilst 
Spencer and Ritchie (2012) acknowledge that reliability in the sense of 
replicability is not possible in qualitative research, they advocate for 
studies to be evaluated in terms of a clear rationale and defensible 
approach to research design. In addition, has the researcher considered 
reflexivity, in the impact of their role, presence, and values on the research 
process? 
 
The above criteria were utilised to evaluate the quality of the present study, and 
are presented in greater detail in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
2.6. Reflexivity 
 
Harper & Thompson (2012) define reflexivity as “the ability to engage critically in 
understanding the contribution the researcher’s experiences and circumstances 
have had in shaping a given study (and its findings)”. In a Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis, as all forms of knowledge are discursive practices, the work of the 
researcher is also viewed through the same framework (Willig, 2013). Therefore, 
it is important to take a reflexive approach to the research, considering what has 
contributed towards the construction of the knowledge claims of the thesis. In 
working towards reflexivity, a research reflective log was kept throughout the 
thesis, which was used to inform considerations of reflexivity in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter will present a report of the findings made during the analytic 
process. Firstly, there will be a presentation of the prevalent constructions of 
paranoia present within interviews, before then demonstrating how these 
intersected with discourses of gender. The chapter then considers what subject 
positions were made available within these discursive constructions, as well as 
how individuals took these up, or positioned others, and the subsequent 
consequences for individual subjectivity. 
 
3.2. Discursive Constructions of Paranoia  
 
This first section of the analysis will focus on outlining the ways in which paranoia 
was described by interviewees, highlighting the elements that comprised 
discursive constructions. Throughout interviews, participants gave descriptions of 
paranoia that appeared consistent with the continuum approach to paranoia 
discussed in the introduction. They did this primarily by drawing on discursive 
constructions of the opposite ends of the spectrum. For example, participants 
made reference to a discursive construction of paranoia which presented it as a 
normal and common experience with some basis in reality, as well as one which 
presented paranoia as more abnormal, more associated with mental health and 
with less basis in reality. Participants did not necessarily explicitly contrast these 
discursive constructions in the interviews. More often, the way in which an 
experience of paranoia was described could be seen as implicitly contrasting it 
with the construction of the opposite end. For example, descriptions of paranoia 
as abnormal included language which stressed how unusual and uncommon it 
was. This section will therefore present the prevalent discursive constructions at 
both end of this spectrum, along with the elements that comprised each. The 
decision was taken to group and present the constructions of paranoia in this way 
in order to reflect both the range of discursive resources drawn upon, and to 
highlight the differences between these conceptualisations of paranoia.  
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Table 2.  
Summary of prevalent discursive constructions of common/normalised paranoia, 
and abnormal/clinical paranoia.  
Common and Normalised Paranoia 
“Just a phase”  
Paranoia as a transient mood state 
“it was this sense” 
Paranoia as a sense or awareness 
“Something might be happening” 
An experience of suspicion 
“It is a reasonable sort of fear” 
Plausible experiences of paranoia 
“That’s a reason that allowed you to have the fear” 
Paranoia with a basis in reality 
“You have all these responsibilities”  
Paranoia as a response to social pressures 
 
Abnormal and Clinical Paranoia 
“To you and I that would seem absurd” 
Paranoia as absurd and insane 
“that’s in his head” 
A paranoia not based in reality 
“that’s when we intervene” 
Paranoia that is out of control, threatening, or has gone too far 
“it becomes really intolerable” 
Paranoia that builds up if not expressed 
“they’re not recognising that as an abnormal thing” 
Paranoia that is hard to express 
 
3.2.1. Common and normalised paranoia 
 
This section of the analysis will outline how interviewees drew upon a 
construction of paranoia that appeared to represent a more common and 
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everyday experience, of a more normalised nature. This broader construction 
appeared to be comprised of various elements, portraying an experience based 
on ideas of a transient mood or feeling, related to suspicion, with a plausible 
basis in reality. Each element of this broader discursive construction will be 
presented in turn, along with illustrative quotes. 
 
3.2.1.1. “Just a phase” – paranoia as a transient mood state 
One way in which the wider construct of common or normalised paranoia was 
conveyed, was as a transient or temporary experience that passed over time and 
was not chronic. In this way interviewees appeared to draw on a construct of 
paranoia in which it was considered as more akin to an emotional state than to a 
symptom or diagnosable mental health condition. 
 
Carlos: You’ve got paranoia the mood and you feel a bit paranoid. You can 
have paranoia for like a couple of months or so, and it will eventually go 
away (70-71). 
 
In the extract above, Carlos refers to “paranoia the mood”, where a person might 
feel “a bit paranoid”. This conveys to the listener a form of paranoia which feels 
akin to a mood or emotion, which is limited, or of minimal strength. In addition, his 
reference to time scales and “it will eventually go away” portrays a more transient 
and temporary experience. Constructing paranoia in this way can be seen to 
render the experience differently, when compared to a more stable and ongoing 
notion of a mental health symptom or diagnosis. 
 
Sandra: Yeah cause I’ve had anxiety, and then with, when I had it, cause I 
wasn’t diagnosed with it or anything like that <Interviewer: Mmm hmm>, I 
just had a phase with it, and then, as I was going through it, I did feel 
paranoid (22-24). 
 
In the extract above, Sandra acknowledges an experience of “anxiety”, before 
appearing to separate this from something that you could be “diagnosed with”. In 
this way, she describes an experience or feeling of anxiety that is constructed as 
not a diagnosable mental health condition. As a result, Sandra draws upon a 
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construct of a form of paranoia which again feels more like an emotional state, as 
opposed to a symptom. She goes on speak of the experiences as “just a phase”, 
again portraying to the listener the transient nature of the experience. 
 
3.2.1.2. “it was this sense” – paranoia as a sense or awareness 
Following on from the experience being described as a mood state, paranoia was 
at times also constructed as a sense or awareness, perhaps similar to an 
intuition. In describing experiences of paranoia in this way, it can be said that 
interviewees drew upon a construct of the experience as a more normalised or 
understandable one, related to a perceived awareness of others actions or 
intentions. This appears to contrast with the descriptions of abnormal or serious 
paranoia outlined later in this chapter, which construct it as something much 
more absurd in nature, and less understandable. 
 
Sofia: Yeah I think it was this sense that, people are not being completely 
honest <Interviewer: Mmm>. That somebody is not being completely 
honest, and you don’t have a proof about it (100-102). 
 
In this example extract, Sofia draws on a construction of paranoia experiences as 
a “sense”, related to the actions of other people who are “not being completely 
honest”. In this way paranoia is constructed as an ineffable or inchoate 
experience, related to an awareness of the possible intentions of others. 
 
3.2.1.3. “Something might be happening” – an experience of suspicion 
In a similar way to framing paranoia as a sense, interviewees also spoke of 
paranoia in a way that constructed it as an experience related to ordinary mistrust 
and suspicion, along with a need for probing as to the truth of the experience. In 
addition, it was spoken of in a way that implied a function related to ordinary 
vigilance around the possibility of future threats. 
 
Sofia: So I certainly have had moments of, I would describe of paranoia, 
but not clinical paranoia. <Interviewer: Okay yes yes> and I have mistrust 
and suspicion and mistrust of something might be happening, and you 
need to prove (70-72).  
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In this extract, Sofia acknowledges an experience of paranoia, before contrasting 
this with “clinical paranoia”. This separation draws on constructions of paranoia 
as two different experiences, one of clinical significance, and one not. Sofia goes 
on to describe the non-clinical form as an experience of “mistrust and suspicion”. 
She speaks of a “need to prove”, suggesting a need to probe for the truth, and an 
implicit acknowledgement that it might not be true. 
 
Simon: So the suspicion is that either. For example it could be that they, or 
you think that something’s happened. <Interviewer: Mmm> erm for a 
reason, but it’s not apparent. So you’re trying to sort of. And then it can 
become your central focus of like, of your paranoia. In a kind of way 
<Interviewer: Mmm> because you’re trying to figure it out (25-29). 
 
In a similar way to Sofia, Simon in this extract equates paranoia with “suspicion”, 
offering the example that “somethings happened” but it’s “not apparent”. In this 
way he appears to draw upon a construction of paranoia as a drive to work out 
some form of truth about a situation, either current or past. The use of “not 
apparent” suggests some truth behind the experience, and thus not a completely 
irrational experience set apart from reality.  
 
Lien: Something that could happen I think <Interviewer: okay> or that if 
you do things this happens, kind of thing. Erm predicting what can happen. 
Or maybe due to an experience or what other people have said, just 
assuming things as well (19-21). 
 
In this extract, Lien appears to present the experience of suspicion in a slightly 
more conflicted way, using lots of qualifiers such as “could”, “can” and 
“assuming”. In this way paranoia is constructed as not a fact, but a potential truth. 
In addition, this conveys a function as a form of vigilance about possible future 
threats.  
 
3.2.1.4. “It is a reasonable sort of fear” – plausible experiences of paranoia 
A further aspect of the construction of a common or normalised experience of 
paranoia appeared to involve consideration of ideas of plausibility and 
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reasonableness. Interviewees at times commented on ideas of a reasonable or 
plausible amount of fear for a person to experience, drawing on ideas that there 
could be a threat, or a context of danger. A construction of a more normalised 
experience of paranoia was therefore drawn upon, in describing events and 
experiences as somewhat plausible, which appears to contrast with ideas of a 
more abnormal form of paranoia presented later in this chapter. 
 
Carlos: But, I think as I understand it is a reasonable, it is a reasonable 
sort of fear <Interviewer: Mmm>. His father left him and if he thinks he 
might be involved in gangs, especially in North East London, it’s a very 
stereotypical thing, but you know, East London gangs. I think, you know, 
it’s not a total irrational fear (437-440). 
 
In this extract Carlos is responding to being presented with the vignette 
describing an experience of paranoia in a young man. Carlos interprets the 
person’s experience as a “reasonable sort of fear”, before giving the rationale that 
there might actually be a presence of “East London gangs”. In this way, he draws 
on a discursive construct of a form of paranoia that is not totally irrational, but is 
an experience where there is a plausibility behind the fear, based on contextual 
information. 
 
Becky: Yeah I think that’s true. Everybody must be paranoid to some 
degree. I think that it probably was adaptive… Sometimes people are 
talking about you [laughs]. Sometimes people are plotting to do you some 
kind of harm. So to be aware of that, I mean, I think maybe it’s born out of 
the way that we are (42-45). 
 
In this extract, Becky similarly appears to draw on ideas of a plausible form of 
paranoia, using several different methods to achieve this. She speaks of how 
“everybody must be paranoid to some degree”, constructing the experience as 
universal. Becky then draws on evolutionary discourses in stating that a form of 
paranoia “probably was adaptive”. In this way constructing the experience as 
related to normal adaptive vigilance against threat. She then goes on to speak to 
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the concepts of a justified level of fear, with a plausibility due to the possible 
reality of harm or negative intent from others. 
 
3.2.1.5. “That’s a reason that allowed you to have the fear” – paranoia with a 
basis in reality 
An additional aspect of the construct of a common or normalised paranoia was 
that the experience has some form of a basis in reality. Interviewees framed 
many experiences of paranoia as having some form of connection to a real 
experience, and therefore not fully detached from reality. This contrasted 
strikingly with descriptions of other experiences that portrayed a more abnormal 
form of paranoia, which will be outlined later in this chapter. 
 
Carlos: You know, that person would have a reason, my friend got cheated 
on, I watched ‘Mr. Robot’ you know, that’s a reason that allowed you to 
have that fear (127-129). 
 
In this extract, Carlos is referring to his fear about internet security, and 
subsequent acts to protect himself. Carlos speaks of having “a reason that 
allowed you to have that fear”, referencing having watched a series about 
hackers, and his friend’s experiences of infidelity. Carlos therefore appears to 
draw upon a construction of a form of paranoia that has a basis in reality, 
implicitly separated from other experiences that might not, and may therefore be 
constructed as more abnormal. 
 
Amy: And I think that had a basis in truth as well. Because people are 
trying to save money, and they will take it where they can, kind of thing. 
But that’s kind of the lower end of the spectrum I guess, because erm 
there’s some paranoia within that, but it’s harmless (69-72). 
 
Here Amy is talking about a mental health client’s belief that the government is 
removing benefits deliberately. Amy speaks of the belief as having “a basis in 
truth”, portraying a similarly justified experience of paranoia. Interestingly, Amy 
then refers to this as “on the lower end of the spectrum”, where there is “some 
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paranoia… but it’s harmless”. Here the paranoia is seen not only as reality-
based, but also as not seriously distressing, as a more intense belief might be. 
 
Becky: Yeah okay yeah so, I mean, I guess like the idea of walking home 
by yourself, late at night. I think we are aware that there is a danger 
<Interviewer: Right>. It’s just to what point that gets amplified, or muted, I 
guess (92-93). 
 
Here is another example of paranoia constructed as having a basis in reality, in 
relation to a woman’s experience of fear when walking home alone, and the 
judgment that “there is a danger”. Becky then goes on to speak about a “point 
where that gets amplified, or muted”, suggesting differences in the intensity of 
fear. In this way, paranoia appears to be portrayed as an experience of fear 
based in reality, but where one could over or under respond to or react. 
 
3.2.1.6. “You have all these responsibilities” –paranoia as a response to social 
pressures 
As well as relating it to an experience of fear with a basis in reality, interviewees 
spoke of some experiences of paranoia as a response to social pressures or 
expectations. This type of paranoid experience was conveyed in a way that 
suggested a form of negative self-talk, or self-evaluation. In addition, this form of 
experience was more likely to be attributed to the self as opposed to others. This 
form of paranoia also appeared to contrast with constructions of more abnormal 
or serious paranoia, in that they were related more to threatening and implausible 
experiences, as opposed to purely social pressures. 
 
Simon: Erm. Well it can easily be an overwhelming feeling, that you have 
all these responsibilities erm. And you that expectation leads to sort of erm 
a breakdown of functioning. So erm, and then that break down of 
functioning leads to a sort of paranoia, because you feel incompetent and 
unable to complete these tasks. (119-201). 
 
In the extract above, Simon describes the impact of “responsibilities” as 
“overwhelming”, with the potential to impair functioning and impact the ability to 
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fulfil these responsibilities. He appears to draw upon a construction of paranoia 
which is a consequence of feeling unable to meet these responsibilities, 
appearing to suggest that the experience of paranoia is equated with a form of 
self-criticism. 
 
Lien: Yeah and you don’t want to do things wrong! So you’re constantly 
questioning yourself, are you doing it wrong? Right? Etcetera. 
<Interviewer: Mmm mmm> and that could also build up as paranoia (130-
131). 
 
In a similar way to Simon, Lien here speaks of a process of “constantly 
questioning yourself” that could “build up as paranoia”. In this way, she appears 
to also draw from this construction of paranoia as a form of self-doubt and 
internal dialogue, or negative self-talk. 
 
In summary of the overall themes, interviewees at times drew upon different 
features of an overall construction of paranoia, in which it was portrayed or 
considered more as a common and normalised experience, in the form of a 
sense, a phase, a mood or experience of self-doubt. This type of paranoia was 
articulated as a more benign experience, related to feelings of mistrust, 
suspicion, and the anticipation of possible threats, or as a response to social 
pressures and expectations. An important element of the discursive construction 
related to there being some plausibility to others, and a basis in reality, as well as 
a low level of intensity. 
 
3.2.2. Abnormal and clinical paranoia 
 
In contrast to a more normalised and common form of paranoia, interviewees 
also at times drew upon a construction of a much more abnormal, irrational and 
clinically significant type of paranoid experience. This more serious or abnormal 
form of paranoia was discursively constructed both explicitly, through describing 
experiences with self and others, and implicitly by being contrasted with the 
previously outlined more normalised experiences. This section will aim to present 
the various ways in which this conceptualisation was drawn upon throughout 
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interviews, as well as the individual elements that made up this broader 
discursive construction. Later in the analysis, a particular focus will be placed on 
times where, within interviews participants positioned themselves and others 
across these two discourses. 
 
3.2.2.1. “To you and I that would seem absurd” – paranoia as absurd and insane 
An interesting way in which this more serious and irrational form of paranoia was 
constructed involved the use of vivid and extreme case examples and stories, as 
well as references to mental health. These appeared to convey to the listener a 
form of paranoia that was more out of the ordinary, unreasonable and 
implausible, as well as one where the person cannot distinguish between fantasy 
and the reality of the external world. 
 
Becky: Mmm yeah. I mean I had a boyfriend once who was insanely 
paranoid, that because he had tattoos, doctors, especially Asian doctors, 
would want to contaminate him with aids, if he was going to go their 
practice for anything. Which was obviously quite a paranoid belief. Which 
is quite a weird one as well (117-119).  
 
In the above extract, Becky uses explicit markers such as “insane”, “weird” and 
“paranoid”, in a way that serves to convey to the listener a belief that stands out 
for its absurdity. Becky presents the experience of her boyfriend, pointing to the 
“obvious” nature of the belief as irrational. She highlights some of the 
idiosyncratic details of the belief, such as the connection with Asian doctors that 
presents the belief as having no obvious or logical rationale. In this way, she 
appears to draw upon a discursive construction of paranoia as an obviously weird 
or irrational experience. 
 
Amy: So quite recently we had a case of someone who believed their child 
who was 6 years old, was actually a spy… to you and I that would seem 
absurd. That child’s a six year old. How could they be a spy? (72-76). 
 
In this extract, Amy employs a similar discursive technique, utilising an extreme 
example to convey a form of paranoia that she calls “absurd”. Interestingly her 
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use of “to you and I” seems to position her and the listener, inviting the listener to 
consensually evaluate the beliefs as odd. In both these extracts, a construct of an 
irrational form of paranoia is drawn upon, in which there is a lack of any 
plausibility to the beliefs, and it is hard to see within the bounds of possibility how 
someone would come to have such a belief. This appears to contrast with the 
constructions of a more normalised type of experience that were outlined in 
earlier sections of this chapter. 
 
Sofia: one of my friend’s brother is a schizophrenic and he has high levels 
of paranoia. <Interviewer: Mmm>. You know, he believes whatever’s in his 
mind is true (73-75). 
 
Here in this extract, Sofia conveys her brother’s friends’ experiences within the 
discourse of mental health, as “schizophrenic”. She describes his experiences as 
“high levels” and therefore not low or harmless (as in the construction of more 
common and normalised paranoia), and points to an inability to distinguish 
between the external world or reality, and an internal fantasy. 
 
3.2.2.2. “that’s in his head” – a paranoia not based in reality 
In contrast to what was outlined previously in the construction of common or 
normalised paranoia, the discursive construction of more abnormal and irrational 
paranoia often comprised descriptions of an experience with no basis in reality 
(i.e. no situational context which would render it plausible) and where there is no 
real or present danger or threat, or of one where there is some plausible context 
but the fear is out of proportion to this. 
 
Sofia: What if? You know? Imagination goes wild. You know that sense of, 
you know, yes I mean I might be doing something that is not considered to 
be safe, but there’s no indication of danger around, and no danger around, 
and I’m actually feeling really scared…I should have taken the bus 
basically [laughs] (137-144). 
 
In this example, Sofia has described an experience of fear when walking home 
alone, that she labelled as paranoid. In this extract, Sofia appears to justify that 
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labelling by stating that there was “no indication of danger around”, despite her 
“feeling really scared”. In this way, a construction of paranoia is drawn upon, 
where there is an experience of fear, however there is also a judgement by self or 
others that there is no real danger or basis for it. 
 
Simon: But maybe that’s his paranoia starting to show there. So then it 
escalates there. Cause you said there’s no actual physical violence as 
such, so that’s in his head (303-305). 
 
In this example, Simon is responding to being presented with the vignette during 
the interview. Interestingly, the extract shows how Simon appears to have 
reached a point in the story where he no longer judges that account as 
acceptable, stating that “maybe that’s his paranoia starting to show there”. In this 
way, the experience is constructed as one lacking in plausible context, as well as 
one where the person is failing to differentiate between what’s “in his head” and 
what is reality. 
 
Bilal: Well my experience of why it’s tricky working with paranoia, 
sometimes it’s basis is like yeah, it’s got like a tiny <Interviewer: yeah> 
fraction of truth or foundation <Interviewer: Mmm mmm>. That can be 
what makes it complicated (187-189). 
 
In some contrast to the above definitive split, Bilal acknowledges elements of 
truth in paranoid accounts, and describes the experience as not having quite so 
clear a divide. Thus, a construct of paranoia appears to be utilised, in which there 
is some level of plausible context, however there is an issue of proportionality, 
whereby the fear is judged as out of proportion to the amount of available 
evidence. 
 
3.2.2.3. “that’s when we intervene” – paranoia that is out of control, threatening, 
or has gone too far 
In addition to being portrayed as a more absurd or irrational experience, more 
abnormal forms of paranoia were often described as experiences that had 
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crossed a threshold into something others would consider out of control, 
threatening, or maladaptive. 
 
Amy: but it’s when they start to voice any thoughts about acting, retaliation 
and becoming aroused or something like that, that’s when we intervene 
(54-56). 
 
In this extract, Amy is referring to her work in a mental health setting. She 
describes acting on paranoid thoughts as a key criterion for concern, whereby the 
belief has consequences in the real world, and possibly is no longer harmless. 
Her use of the word “retaliation” suggests an aggressive action, taken against 
perceived aggressors. In this way, Amy appears to draw upon a construction of 
paranoia as a potentially threatening or dangerous phenomena, requiring 
intervention from others. 
 
Becky: Most certainly once the paranoia goes too far, it again becomes 
maladaptive. Because me being spooked and running, is actually putting 
me in a more vulnerable situation, you know (96-98). 
 
In this example above, Becky describes an experience of paranoia that has 
crossed a threshold from something judged as acceptable to something 
“maladaptive”. In this way, a construction of paranoia is drawn upon, in which the 
experience has gone too far, and moved out of the range of normality and 
acceptability and into something counter-productive. 
 
3.2.2.4. “it becomes really intolerable” – paranoia that builds up if not expressed 
Many interviewees portrayed paranoia as an experience or emotion that in some 
way builds up or accumulates over time. Of particular interest, was how a 
discursive construction of a more abnormal form of paranoia was drawn upon, in 
which this build up had occurred too much, and there had been no form of 
cathartic release or expression. 
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Adila: I think that it is something that it builds up, it doesn’t stop 
<Interviewer: Right>. From time to time you will realise that what was [.] 
something that it was bearable at some point. It just <Interviewer: Mmm>. 
Everything is just something that it becomes really intolerable (59-62). 
 
In this extract, paranoia is constructed as something that builds up, in a way that 
appears to draw upon hydraulic metaphors of emotional experiences, as an 
internal force or pressure that needs releasing. Adila described a movement from 
“bareable” to “something… really intolerable”, suggesting that a paranoid 
experience is one where there has been a change in the ability of a person to 
manage or control the experience. 
 
Becky: Maybe it’s when it snowballs into that, because for exactly that 
reason, because they haven’t expressed it and talked it through, and come 
to understand that they were being paranoid or that it wasn’t completely 
founded (269-271). 
 
Becky describes something similar in this extract, a process of “snowballing”, 
however she goes on to speak of this as “occurring because they haven’t 
expressed it”. This was a common construction of experiences of paranoia 
across the spectrum, that it is an experience that needed to be expressed, again 
drawing upon metaphors of emotion and concepts of cathartic release, as well as 
pointing to talking through experiences as a management strategy. 
 
3.2.2.5. “they’re not recognising that as an abnormal thing” – paranoia that is 
hard to express 
In addition to being described as an experience that may build up if not 
expressed, experiences of paranoia were often described as something more 
inherently difficult or problematic to express or talk about, with connotations of 
craziness and negative judgement from others. 
 
Amy: Because they’re not gonna call themselves [paranoid] and tell us “I’m 
having these beliefs” [laughs] because you know, they’re not recognising 
that as an abnormal thing at that point (90-92). 
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In the extract above, Amy described paranoia as an experience a person would 
be unable to “recognise” or admit. She appears to draw from a construction of the 
paranoid person as both having an “abnormal” experience whilst simultaneously 
losing insight or perspective. 
 
Carlos: Cause it’s hard to you know, to open up to yourself and say ‘hey 
I’m paranoid. Cause the whole paranoia thing can be ‘oh my god the 
person is going crazy’ (300-301). 
 
In the above example, Carlos portrays the experience of paranoia as difficult to 
admit or acknowledge, in a similar way to Amy. Additionally, he speaks of how 
another person might respond in a negative manner, whereby they judge the 
person as “going crazy”, and losing their rationality. Similarly, this appears to 
draw from a discursive construction of a more abnormal type of paranoia, 
whereby the person is unlikely to acknowledge their experience, or discuss it, due 
to connotations of craziness and abnormality. 
 
Overall, and in contrast to a construction of more normalised and common 
experience of paranoia, interviewees also at times drew upon a construct of more 
abnormal and clinical experiences of paranoia. This discursive construct 
encompassed experiences that were judged as lacking a form of plausible 
context, and were based in idiosyncratic details, lacking in a rationale that could 
be considered clear or understandable to others. In addition, it was spoken of as 
something that to others seems weird, bizarre or irrational, and as reflecting an 
inability to distinguish between reality and the product of imagination, even when 
a kernel of truth is evident. It was described as disproportionate fear, or one that 
had passed a threshold of normality, that represents a loss of control, and may 
lead to inappropriate actions or those that are maladaptive and counter-
productive. As well as something that could be diminished through talking 
through with others, and as something that builds-up over time particularly if not 
expressed. Lastly, these experiences were spoken of as something that someone 
would be fearful of acknowledging and that may not be recognised by a person, 
especially if given as an interpretation or judgment by another. 
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3.3. Discursive constructions of paranoia and gender 
 
Following on from analysing the constructions of experiences of paranoia that 
were drawn upon and utilised within interviews, this section of the chapter will 
focus on how constructions of paranoia and gender appeared to intersect. The 
section will aim to describe how, within interviews, paranoia was spoken about in 
a gendered manner, constructing the experiences of paranoid men and women in 
different ways. In doing this, interviewees appeared to draw upon discourses of 
gender which were often consistent with hegemonic and stereotyped 
constructions of men and women. In presenting this particular part of the 
analysis, what was constructed as the more male form of paranoia and more 
female form will be presented separately, along with the elements and 
characteristics that appeared to form each discursive construct. 
 
Table 3.  
Summary of discursive constructions of male and female paranoia. 
Paranoia associated with men 
“somebody’s coming to physically harm him” 
Paranoia in men and external threats 
“you reflect on yourself and that can cause more paranoia” 
Paranoia and the male role 
“he gets really paranoid and it’s really scary” 
Paranoia and aggression in men 
“there’s that whole massive burst of emotion and fear” 
Paranoia in men as suppressed 
“it might be hard to find men, men who would admit to it” 
Paranoia in men as not talked about 
“far-fetched ideas” 
Conspiracy theories and paranoia in men 
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Paranoia associated with women 
“women are more neurotic, and we just need to live with that” 
Paranoia in women as normalised 
“it feels lighter” 
Paranoia in women as less serious 
“You’re not thinking so much about them hurting someone else” 
Paranoia in women as internalised 
“I don’t think so and so likes me” 
Paranoia in women as interpersonally focused 
“that I guess is a female feeling” 
Women, street harassment and paranoia 
“we actually talk about it. And we then solve it!” 
Paranoia in women as shared and discussed 
 
3.3.1. Constructions of paranoia associated with men 
 
This section will focus on the various ways in which paranoia in men was spoken 
about and constructed throughout the interviews, and the ways in which 
interviewees appeared to differentiate the experience from ideas of a more 
female experience of paranoia. Each element of the wider discursive construct 
will be presented separately, in order to highlight apparent differences when 
compared with descriptions that were given of female experiences. 
 
3.3.1.1. “somebody’s coming to physically harm him” – paranoia in men and 
external threats 
A prevalent theme in the portrayal of male experiences of paranoia was of an 
externally directed experience and a perception of, or expectation of externalised 
threats, often more physical in nature. In addition, there were also references 
made to a need to act on or defend against these perceived threats. 
 
Bilal: The instant image for a man would be like, somebody’s coming to 
physically harm him, and [2] yeah he’s figuring out what to do (155-156). 
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In this extract, Bilal describes his expectation of a man’s experience of paranoia, 
as an experience of vigilance against a perceived external and physical threat. 
His use of “he’s figuring out what to do” suggests an active experience, wherein 
there is a focus or a plan of action. In this way, there appears to be a possible 
drawing on of discourses related to both paranoia, and what is expected of in the 
primary concerns or behaviour of men. This broadly appeared to differ from the 
descriptions of paranoid experiences in women given later in this chapter, in 
which there was a much more relational focus. 
 
3.3.1.2. “you reflect on yourself and that can cause more paranoia” – paranoia 
and the male role 
As well as being related specifically to external threats, paranoia in men was at 
times described in a way that related it to normative gender roles, or to the 
presence of external social pressures. Paranoia was spoken of as both an 
experience that resulted from men failing to meet these standards, or as a worry 
of the possibility of not meeting them. 
 
Lien: My brother probably has more paranoia regards to like his role, his 
image, as the male lead, how he is doing as the male, if he’s doing the 
right thing etcetera (121-123). 
 
In this extract, Lien speaks of her brother’s experiences in a way that suggests to 
the listener that the primary concern is “how he is doing” as a “male lead”. Here, 
his experience of paranoia are firmly constructed as primarily related to the male 
role and the image that is potentially portrayed to others. There appears to be a 
drawing from of gender discourses in relation to the stereotypical roles of men, 
and to the expectation of concern in relation to meeting these.  
 
Simon: There’s quite a large array of hoops <Interviewer: right> that men 
have to go through. If you get them wrong, you know it doesn’t work. And 
that is quite challenging because you reflect on yourself and that can 
cause more paranoia and depression (133-135). 
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Here, Simon speaks of the expectations placed on men, in a slightly different way 
to Lien. Rather than focusing on awareness of role expectations, Simon 
describes paranoia as a response to having failed to meet them. Thus, a 
construction is drawn on, in which paranoia in men is constructed as related to 
not measuring up to a perceived normative standard, and possible subsequent 
experience of negative self-evaluations. 
 
3.3.1.3. “he gets really paranoid and it’s really scary” – paranoia and aggression 
in men 
Throughout the interviews, paranoia in men was frequently constructed in a 
manner that conveyed a threatening, aggressive, or controlling experience, likely 
to lead to others responding with fear. This appeared present only in description 
of male experiences of paranoia, and did not feature when women’s experiences 
were discussed. 
 
Sofia: So I have friend [laughs] he doesn’t drink much anymore, because 
when he drinks he gets really paranoid and it’s really scary, because this 
kind of like. Yeah if he thinks we are talking about him he gets really, I 
mean, yeah, it’s that sense that he’s not really comfortable. Nothing in him 
is going to listen at that point (378-381). 
 
Here, Sofia describes her experience and impression of her friend, constructing 
his experiences as paranoia. Sofia speaks of her response to the friend, 
describing him as “really scary”. Her description of the experience appears to 
draw upon a construction of paranoia that is scary, unpredictable, and where the 
person refuses to listen or recognise and acknowledge their experience as 
paranoid. In addition, Sofia associated the experience with alcohol, and a lack of 
inhibition or control. These ideas appear to differ from descriptions of paranoia 
experiences in women, given elsewhere in interviews and outlined later in this 
chapter, where a perceived potential for harm was absent. 
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3.3.1.4. “there’s that whole massive burst of emotion and fear” – paranoia in men 
as suppressed 
In addition to being constructed as an intimidating or aggressive experience, 
paranoia in men was frequently described as suppressed and unexpressed, often 
with quite negative connotations to this. These ideas appear to draw heavily on 
common discourses around hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005) and the 
pressure for men to remain in control of and not express emotions. The extracts 
below demonstrate how this discourse in some way intersects with the 
constructions of paranoia analysed earlier in this chapter, of an experience that 
‘builds up’ and becomes dangerous if not released or expressed. 
 
Sofia: I think by the time you notice that a man is paranoid it has all this 
strength behind it. 
 
In this short extract, Sophia describes male paranoia in a way that suggests a 
hidden or suppressed experience that has “strength behind it”. Her use of “by the 
time you notice”, also appears to suggest something that may have built up over 
time. 
 
Carlos: So I guess it’s because men don’t act on it, as much, and then 
they just let that build up happen, until it explodes, and then there’s that 
whole massive burst of emotion and fear (228-229). 
 
Here, men are described as not acting on their experiences, and as letting it 
happen. In addition, Carlos portrays paranoia in men as an experience that 
explodes or bursts, in an unpredictable and dangerous manner. These 
descriptions appear to draw upon discursive constructions both of paranoia as 
needing to be expressed, and gendered discourses of men as not expressing 
emotions, and of male emotions as dangerous and problematised. 
 
3.3.1.5. “it might be hard to find men, men who would admit to it” – paranoia in 
men as not talked about 
Following on from the above, paranoia in men was often constructed as an 
experience that is not recognised or talked about, or is difficult to talk about. This 
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was also at times presented as a contrast to paranoia in women, which was 
constructed as easy to recognise and as more open or shared experience. 
 
Lien: it might be hard to find men, men who would admit to it. <Interviewer: 
Okay> Whereas women would be like “Yeah I’m always thinking like this!” 
you know, talk to someone about it (164-165). 
 
In this extract, Lien constructs men as not able to “admit” to paranoid 
experiences, contrasting this with women, who she conveys in a humorous 
manner, as “always thinking like this” and able to “talk”. 
 
Carlos: So if a man will have a fear that ‘I'm scared that I’m not enough, 
and my girlfriend might leave me for someone else’ <Interviewer: Mmm> 
you know, they might not want to see that weakness, they might not want 
to see themselves as you know, having that weak spot in them (237-240). 
 
Here Carlos speaks in a similar way about men finding it hard to admit 
experiences of paranoia. He constructs the experience of paranoia in men as 
“that weakness” and “having that weak spot”. In this way, Carlos draws on 
discourses of masculinity and strength, suggesting that the reason men might not 
admit these experiences relates to a conflict between these two discourses. 
Interestingly whilst this connection between paranoia and weakness was 
mentioned by several interviewees, the connotation was only made in reference 
to male experiences, and never those of females. 
 
3.3.1.6. “far-fetched ideas” – conspiracy theories and paranoia in men 
A final theme prevalent throughout constructions of male paranoia concerned 
links with conspiracy theory. Experiences of paranoia related to conspiracy theory 
were described as a primarily male interest, and as something women would be 
less interested in, or would not likely experience paranoia around. Interestingly, 
conspiracy theories were often spoken about as if a relatively harmless 
experience, in contrast to the constructions of male paranoia and aggression 
outlined earlier in this section. 
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Bilal: Boys are more into like cars, gadgets, computers, technology. You 
can just see how if you like turn the amplifier volume up on that 
<Interviewer: Mmm> it would lead to more far-fetched ideas about aliens 
and UFO and that sort of things, and wider conspiracy theories (394-397). 
 
Here, Bilal describes the experience an exacerbation of several stereotypically 
male interests. He then goes on to equate conspiracy theory with “far-fetched 
ideas”, demonstrating a form of devaluation of these ideas which was present 
throughout interviews. 
 
Simon: They are fighting against something. They are angry and they’re 
fighting against something. And, when they come out of it, when you stop 
using drugs and you start like “okay let’s figure out the world” and looking 
for your place in it, and how things work out 9389-392). 
 
In this example, Simon is following on from talking somewhat about men’s 
interest in conspiracy theories. He constructs male interest in conspiracy theory 
as a struggle for understanding in the world. He conveys an angry experience, 
and a fight, but it is unclear what this is about and to whom it is directed. Both of 
these extracts appear to draw upon an idea that conspiracy theory would be a 
primarily male interest, and that it is a form of paranoia that is less dangerous or 
concerning to others. 
 
In summary, paranoia in men was described as an experience based in vigilance 
regarding external, and primarily physical threats, as well as something related to 
status and a perceived failure to ‘measure up’ to societal norms. It was portrayed 
as a build-up of supressed emotion that could lead to an explosion of 
unpredictable and uncontrollable force and anger, especially if disinhibited by 
alcohol. This appeared to contrast significantly with the construction of emotional 
openness in women, who were said to acknowledge how common feelings of 
paranoia were. Male paranoia was additionally constructed as synonymous with 
insecurity and an admission of self-doubt, connected with connotations of 
weakness and shame. 
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3.3.2. Constructions of paranoia associated with women 
 
Following on from presenting the common constructions of paranoia associated 
with men, this section will outline the various ways in which women’s experiences 
of paranoia were spoken about by interviewees, as well as the discursive 
constructions drawn upon. Again, each element of the wider discursive construct 
will be presented separately, in order to highlight differences when compared with 
the way in which male experiences of paranoia were talked about. 
 
3.3.2.1. “women are more neurotic, and we just need to live with that” – paranoia 
in women as normalised 
Somewhat in contrast to paranoia in men, female experiences of paranoia were 
often spoken of in a way that portrayed a more common or normalised type of 
experience. This contrasted with the descriptions of paranoia in men described 
earlier in this chapter, where it was constructed as a more abnormal or 
unacceptable, unspoken or suppressed experience. Interestingly, these ideas 
were spoken about by both male and female interviewees. 
 
Becky: Like I say, I think a lot of paranoia is accepted for women. It’s kind 
of seen as quite normal, as women are more neurotic, and we just need to 
live with that [laughs] (420-421). 
 
In this extract, Becky described paranoia in women as “accepted” and “normal”. 
She goes on to link this with ideas of women as neurotic, drawing on the 
discourse of women as the emotional gender (Fischer, 1993), or as more 
common worriers, however with some negative connotations to this, as an inferior 
quality, perhaps implicitly in comparison with discourses of the rational non-
emotional nature of men. Becky’s laughter may imply some irony in her 
statement, where she may recognise this as a somewhat stereotyped description. 
 
3.3.2.2. “it feels lighter” – paranoia in women as less serious 
Following on from being described as a normalised experienced, paranoia in 
women was also often spoken of in way that portrayed a lesser or lighter 
experience. This contrasts with the descriptions of experiences of paranoia in 
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men, outlined earlier in the chapter, where the constructions were of a much 
more dangerous experience. 
 
Sofia: Well I feel that when I have talked to women about it, it’s kind of 
yeah. I have this feeling I have this sense “oh I’m being paranoid” type of 
thing, but it feels lighter. Yeah I haven’t come across anybody that was so 
paranoid that, it becomes as scary, yeah. (398-400). 
 
In this extract, Sophia is talking about her impression of experiences of paranoia 
in women. She speaks in an acknowledgment of experiences of paranoia 
occurring, whilst also describing them as feeling “lighter”, and not “scary”. In this 
way, female experiences of paranoia are implicitly constructed as less dangerous 
or threatening, in comparison with paranoia in men. 
 
Carlos: The male version is a way more physical like manifestation of the 
paranoia, like ‘I need to check up on them’ and ‘I need to take care of my 
family’, ‘I need to, you know, protect them’. While a woman’s is more of a 
lesser manifestation, where it’s like ‘I need to prove myself, do well at 
school’ and stuff like that (476-479). 
 
Here, Carlos describes women’s experiences of paranoia as a “lesser 
manifestation”, comparing it with the more male construction of action against a 
perceived threat. In this way, the paranoia is conveyed as a more internal 
experience, more akin to worries about proving oneself and day-to-day pursuits, 
whilst paranoia in men is spoken of as external, related to threats. Interestingly, 
these worries related to status were also attributed to male experiences of 
paranoia (as described earlier in the analysis) although here are constructed as 
“lesser”. 
 
3.3.2.3. “You’re not thinking so much about them hurting someone else” – 
paranoia in women as internalised 
A further common construction of female experiences of paranoia was one of an 
internalised experience. Interviewees often portrayed women as more likely to 
respond in an emotional way, withdraw and retreat, or harm themselves. This 
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was often spoken of in a way that appeared to contrast with descriptions of 
paranoia in men, and the externalised experience outlined earlier in this chapter, 
related more to threatening explosions of anger. 
 
Carlos: While if he was a woman, it might have been on the other side. 
The ‘oh my god I’m scared, I need to lay down and cry, because I’m 
scared’ (463-464). 
 
Here, Carlos is speaking about his impression of the young man described in the 
vignette, responding to a question about any differences if the person was a 
young woman. Carlos describes how he would expect a woman to respond very 
differently to a man. His use of “scared” and “lay down and cry”, draw on 
discourses of women as vulnerable (Hollander, 2001), and suggest a more 
internalised, emotional experience, where the woman responds in a vulnerable 
way, as opposed to reacting by directly addressing the threat.  
 
Amy: I think with women it’s more a case of the response being us 
wondering if they would hurt themselves <Interviewer: Right>. You’re not 
thinking so much about them hurting someone else <Interviewer: Okay>. 
You know, women are more likely to harm themselves (209-201). 
 
In this extract, Amy talks about her work in mental health, she described how the 
primary concern for women is “if they will hurt themselves”, before going on to 
say that you would worry less about “hurting someone else”. In this way, paranoia 
in women is constructed again as an internalised experience, as well as being 
primarily a concern with a risk to self, as opposed to a risk to others. 
 
3.3.2.4. “I don’t think so and so likes me” – paranoia in women as interpersonally 
focused 
Paranoia in women was often constructed as a socially focused experience, 
wherein the primary concern related to relationships. Again, this appeared to 
contrast with the constructions of paranoia in men outlined earlier in the chapter, 
where the experiences were described as more related to external and primarily 
physical threats. 
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Becky: I think it’s usually “So and so is talking about me. I don’t think so 
and so likes me”. You know, kind of like second guessing people. 
Overthinking things a little bit (254-255). 
 
Here, Becky constructs paranoia in women as a relational experience, relating it 
to concerns about the intentions of others and insecurity in social relationships. 
She describes this as “overthinking things a little bit”, suggesting an exacerbated 
experience of relational worries. Again this is appears to draw heavily from 
apparent discursive constructions of women as primarily concerned with 
relationships. 
 
3.3.2.5. “that I guess is a female feeling” – street harassment and paranoia in 
women 
Somewhat in contrast to the construction of paranoia in women as socially 
related and internally directed, it was also spoken of in relation to street 
harassment and an implied risk of violence from men. Interestingly, this 
construction was only present in interviews with female participants and was not 
spoken about by male interviewees. 
 
Sofia: but that I guess is a female feeling as well <Interviewer: Okay> to 
feel danger at night and when there might not be danger (133-134). 
 
In this extract, Sofia has just talked about some of her experiences of paranoia 
when walking alone at night. She describes “fear of danger at night” as “a female 
feeling” “when there might not be danger”. In portraying the experience in this 
way, Sofia appears to draw on ideas of women as vulnerable, and as likely to feel 
fear. 
 
Becky: Because I think for a female, walking home alone in the dark, then 
there is a risk. You know (94). 
 
Becky here comments on a similar experience, however also states that “there is 
a risk”. This appears to construct this experience as a form of paranoia in women 
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where it is more acceptable or expected for there to be more of an external threat 
focus. 
 
Amy: Women are constantly on guard anyway, throughout their lives…you 
feel like you’re being surveilled constantly <Interviewer: Right>, and it is 
based in reality. So you know, when you’ve got street harassment and 
you’re constantly on your guard, as a woman (30-34). 
 
In this extract, Amy speaks of this fear as “based in reality”, similarly constructing 
the experience as more acceptable. Amy describes woman as “constantly on 
guard”, linking the experience to harassment and being to being “surveilled”. In 
this way, Amy appears to describe a gendered experience for women in public 
space, as under the surveillance, scrutiny or gaze of men (Brown, 1998). 
 
3.3.2.6. “we actually talk about it. And we then solve it!” – paranoia in women as 
shared and discussed 
In sharp contrast to descriptions of men’s experiences of paranoia as not talked 
about, paranoia in women was consistently described as an open and expressed 
experience. In addition, these ideas were linked to discourses around women as 
the emotional sex, openness and the sharing of emotions, and were frequently 
commented on as something helpful. 
 
Sofia: Certainly I speak more of feelings of paranoia, anxiety, whatever it 
is, with women. Cause we tend to speak more about those things? 
<Interviewer: Mmm mmm>. I mean maybe the reason we are less 
paranoid is because we actually talk about it. And we then solve it! (156-
159). 
 
In this extract, Sofia presents herself as able to speak about paranoia with other 
women, before linking this to women in general. She comments on how this leads 
to women being able to “solve it’, implying a pragmatic solution to the problem. 
This presents an interesting intersection of gender discourse and the construction 
of paranoia presented earlier, whereby expressing or talking about paranoia was 
presented as curative or preventative. In addition, this may also represent an 
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implicit drawing on of notions of paranoia as the result of a build-up of something 
unexpressed, as described earlier in the chapter. Here however, women are 
described as able to express it and so prevent any build-up. 
 
Becky: So perhaps it’s a case that when a woman is mildly paranoid, she 
feels more able to express that paranoia, without looking weak or kind of 
like deviating from the stereotype of what it is that she is allowed to do 
(265-267). 
 
Here, Becky similarly speaks of women as able to “express that paranoia”, linking 
to discourses of femininity and the ability to express emotions without 
connotations of weakness (Lutz, 1990). This provides an interesting example of 
how gendered discourses appear to allow for women to manage paranoid 
experiences or feelings in a more emotionally open way. 
 
In summary, female experiences of paranoia were constructed as related to 
neurosis, and were positioned as an expected or normalised experience for a 
woman to have. Women’s experiences of paranoia were described in a way that 
contrasted with the externalised, supressed and dangerousness of male 
paranoia, in being constructed as internalised, emotionally open, and not 
dangerous to others. It was spoken of as related to thinking about one’s status in 
intimate and social relationships, as well as how one is seen or judged by others. 
The experience of street harassment was equated with a female experience of 
paranoia, despite also being positioned as based in reality. Lastly, paranoia in 
women was linked with constructions of women as open, and discussed as 
something that can be shared with others, preventing a build-up and facilitating 
problem solving and reality testing. 
 
3.4. Subject Positions and Action Orientation 
 
Having outlined the various constructions of gender and paranoia prevalent within 
interviews, the analysis will now consider how these discursive constructions 
were deployed, and what subject positions were subsequently made available. 
The positioning of self and others can be understood as “a dynamic alternative to 
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the more static concept of role”, in which discourses present a variety of 
‘positions’ for a ‘subject’ or person to take up (van Langenhove & Harre, 1999). 
Following on from this, action orientation will be considered, this refers to how 
discursive constructions are utilised by individuals within talk, and subsequently 
what is achieved by the constructing or positioning of a subject in that way (Willig, 
2013). 
 
3.4.1. Positioning self as acceptably paranoid 
 
Having available two different constructions of paranoia, at opposing ends of the 
continuum, as either a normalised and rational experience or as an abnormal and 
irrational one, offered two different and quite opposing subject positions. 
Interviewees frequently allowed themselves to adopt the position of 
acknowledging a normalised experience of paranoia, whilst positioning others 
within the abnormal or serious paranoia position. This discursive action appeared 
to function in a way that rendered their own experiences as more acceptable or 
understandable. Several different discursive practices were utilised in the taking 
up of one position over another (Davies & Harre, 1999), which will be described 
in turn in this section of the analysis. 
 
3.4.1.1. “but not clinical paranoia” – positioning one’s own experiences in relation 
to the discourse of mental health 
One way in which interviewees appeared to position their own experiences as 
within the more acceptable construct of paranoia, was through the making of a 
direct comparison with concepts of abnormal or clinical paranoia, and drawing 
from available discourses of mental health. 
 
Sofia: So I certainly have had moments of, I would describe of paranoia, 
but not clinical paranoia (70-71). 
 
In this example, Sofia acknowledges and shares her own experience of paranoia, 
whilst also positioning this within the wider discourse of paranoia as “not clinical”, 
and therefore within the bounds of a more normalised or common experience. In 
this way, Sofia has differentiated her experiences by anticipating the potential for 
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an alternative and more pathological interpretation, and then subsequently 
rejecting this. 
 
3.4.1.2. “It’s not necessarily gonna harm me” – positioning self as rationally 
paranoid 
A further method utilised by interviewees in positioning their own experiences as 
acceptably paranoid, concerned the drawing upon of the construction that 
normalised paranoia is a rational and plausible experience, as previously outlined 
in section 3.2.1.4. Interviewees at times appeared to utilise this element of the 
wider discursive construction, by outlining to the listener how their experience 
could be judged as ‘rational’.  
 
Carlos: I go out of my way to do certain things to protect it. It’s not 
necessarily gonna harm me, it’s doing some sort of good, it’s protecting 
my things (45-46). 
 
In this example, Carlos constructs and positions himself and his experiences as a 
plausible and useful form of paranoia, and as a rational vigilance against possible 
threats. He acknowledges but also dismisses the potential for harm, suggesting a 
drawing on of discourses at both ends of the continuum, before positioning 
himself within the none harmful end. 
 
3.4.1.3. “and then your life’s pretty much over” – establishing that there is a real 
risk 
Interviewees also positioned their experiences as more acceptable through 
drawing upon and utilising the construction presented in section 3.2.2.2, wherein 
more normalised paranoia experiences have a basis in real risk or potential for 
harm. Interviewees at times described experiences in a way that attempted to 
portray to the listener that there was a real threat or risk, and that the paranoia 
experience therefore has a basis within reality.  
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Carlos: Someone can pay a deep-web hacker five hundred euros and he 
can plant some, you know, he can plant some really nasty evidence in 
your computer, without you even knowing, and then send an anonymous 
tip, and then your life’s pretty much over <Interviewer: Right> just because 
you didn’t have control of your own security (107-110). 
 
In this extract, Carlos refers to his experiences as related to fears about the 
security of his personal information. Carlos conveys to the listener that there is a 
threat based in reality, with severe consequences, “your life’s pretty much over”. 
In this way, his experiences are positioned within the construct of normalised or 
common paranoia, through an implicit cost-benefit analysis of the potential cost of 
vigilance versus the cost or impact of being hacked. 
 
3.4.1.4. “obviously when I had my child, I had anxiety” – positioning self as having 
a reason for the paranoia 
Through drawing on the construction of more normalised paranoia as 
experiences that have a reason or basis in reality (section 3.2.1.5), interviewees 
were also able to position their own experiences as more acceptable. 
 
Sandra: As I was going through it, I did feel paranoid I did feel like. Cause I 
have a child, so obviously when I had my child, I had anxiety (23-24). 
 
In this example, Sandra is following on from talking about her fears that others 
judge her as a bad mum, labelling this as paranoia. Sandra acknowledges this as 
being “paranoid”, before saying that her having a child would “obviously” make 
her have this anxiety, drawing upon cultural constructions of mothers as needing 
to be vigilant and responsible for protecting their children, and positioning her 
experiences as thus having a reason or justification. 
 
3.4.1.5. “never to the level that has hindered my capacity” - positioning self as not 
impacted by experiences 
A final way in which interviewees positioned their experiences within the more 
acceptable end of the paranoia continuum, was through describing themselves 
as not impacted by experiences, or by positioning the experiences as 
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manageable and within the bounds of what can be considered normal. In this 
way, some of the earlier described constructions of paranoia are drawn upon, of 
paranoid experiences being evaluated against the potential impact and disruption 
to functioning.  
 
Sofia: But never to the level that has hindered my capacity to have a life in 
society (72-73). 
 
In this extract, Sofia positions herself through describing how her “capacity to 
have a life” has not been “hindered”. In this way, Sofia can acknowledge paranoid 
experiences, without conveying that these had strayed over into something that 
could be judged as more abnormal, are ‘intolerable’, require support from others, 
or prevent her from meeting the culturally determined requirements of a normal 
life. 
 
3.4.2. Positioning self and others in relation to ‘reality’ 
 
A further way in which interviewees positioned themselves and others within 
discursive constructions, related to comparisons made with a notion of ‘reality’ or 
‘truth’. These examples of discursive positioning occurred both in terms of 
appraising one’s own experiences, and the experiences of others, in terms of 
alignment to the ‘real world’. 
 
3.4.2.1. “was something really going on?” – positioning self within internal 
dialogues 
When discussing their own experiences, interviewees often alluded to engaging 
in a form of internal dialogue at the time of having paranoid thoughts or 
experiences. Within descriptions of these processes, interviewees took the 
position of multiple selves engaging in a form of internal dialogue (Hallam & 
O'Connor, 2002) about the truth or reality of fears. Reality was in this way 
appeared to be constructed through partly an ongoing process of questioning and 
engaging in “what if’s”. 
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Carlos: Because it sounds like if you’re arguing with yourself “should I drop 
this?” the reason will always be the thing, the reason why you shouldn’t. 
There’s always that “what if” you know <Interviewer: Yeah>? So I guess 
that’s the main point, yeah (129-132). 
 
In this extract, Carlos talks about “arguing with yourself” in relation to a reason 
why a fear shouldn’t be dropped, and “what if”s. In this way, Carlos conveys to 
the listener a process of internal dialogue around the fear and if it should be 
dropped. Carlos appears to position himself within the dialogue as having a 
“reason” to not drop the fear, subsequently justifying to himself the continuing of 
paranoid experiences or the subsequent behaviours. 
 
Sofia: I couldn’t see anybody following me, and there was nobody, but I 
had this sense that, I was really scared, and was something really going 
on? (123-125). 
 
A similar process is conveyed in this extract, where Sofia speaks of her thoughts 
at the time of experiencing fear when walking home alone. She describes on one 
hand not being able to see “anybody following me”, but on the other hand 
wondering “was something really going on?”. She appears to be engaging in a 
process of positioning herself between these two dialogical poles, as a way of 
considering the justification for feeling “really scared”. In addition, this extract 
provides an example of paranoid subjectivity serving a function, wherein Sofia 
can engage in this time of thinking, possibly as a way of experiencing a sense of 
control in this ambiguous situation. 
 
3.4.2.2. “a moment to check your own thoughts” – dialogical reality testing with 
others. 
An alternative way in which participants appeared to position themselves in 
relation to reality, involved entering dialogue with others and co-constructing an 
understanding of the truth. Interestingly, this form of reality testing was 
constructed as a primarily ‘female’ ability, linked to the discourses of paranoia in 
women as more spoken about, and paranoia in men as unrecognised, 
unacknowledged, and supressed. 
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Becky: And then that opportunity gives you a moment to check your own 
thoughts. You know “Am I being a bit silly there?” Maybe they could say 
“oh you’re being silly, she was in a bad mood. She missed the bus, she 
probably wasn’t looking at you like that”. Then you could say “Oh okay” 
(295-298).  
 
In this extract, Becky describes engaging in a process of reality testing with 
friends, concerning socially related paranoia. There appears to be an 
acknowledgment that one’s own view may be impaired, and a subsequent 
engaging in a dialogical process with others in order to share perception, and 
generate alternative interpretations. 
 
3.4.2.3. “yeah people aren’t out to get them” - positioning the paranoid person as 
needing to see reality 
An interesting way in which others were at timed positioned by interviewees, was 
as needing to be convinced of reality. This process of reality testing another 
person was often suggested as a way of stopping the other person from being 
paranoid, along with simultaneously being constructed as something very hard to 
accomplish, suggesting a drawing on of ideas of ‘paranoid’ people as irrational. 
 
Adila: Does the person acknowledge? No they don’t, they don’t. They have 
an excuse. They find an excuse. They think they are the normal 
<Interviewer: Mmm>. You are not the one <Interviewer: Mmm>. So it’s 
very hard to try to explain them the difference (71-73). 
 
Here, Adila speaks generally of paranoid others, commenting that they don’t 
“acknowledge” and instead “find an excuse”. In this way, the discourse of 
irrational paranoia as not acknowledged is drawn upon, and the paranoid other is 
quite firmly positioned as both needing to see “the difference”, and as not being 
able to, suggesting a quite powerless subject position. 
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Bilal: because you want to support people but also what they are saying 
isn’t true necessarily. <Interviewer: Mmm> Yeah people aren’t out to get 
them. So you’re trying to do this sort of version of reassurance that is 
hopefully not kind of also just missing what they’re saying. (28-30). 
 
In this extract, Bilal positions the paranoid other’s experiences as not “true 
necessarily” and the person subsequently as needing “reassurance”. This 
suggests a slightly less confrontational position as in Adila’s extract, however still 
places the other person in the subject position of ‘isn’t true’ in relation to a notion 
of reality. 
 
3.5. Practice and Subjectivity 
 
In the final section of this chapter the focus will be placed on the relationship 
between discourse and practice, and the resulting consequences for subjectivity. 
As outlined by Willig (2013), practice concerns the way in which the discursive 
constructions and subject positions described in previous sections ‘open up’ and 
‘close down’ opportunities for action, and limit or constrain what can be said and 
done. In turn, subjectivities are the subsequent consequences for individual’s 
subjective experience, and therefore the result of being positioned in these ways. 
Foucault linked this process with the practice of power, through describing how 
individuals or ‘subjects’ are produced within discourse, and therefore have limited 
or constrained agency (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). For this study, the importance 
is in considering the consequences for individual subjectivity, of being positioned 
in terms of the discourses of ‘paranoid man’ and ‘paranoid women’. 
 
3.5.1. Who can express paranoia, and how? 
 
The discursive constructions of paranoia and gender outlined so far in this 
chapter have several potential consequences for practice and subjectivity, in 
terms of how they limit the expressions and actions of an individual judged as 
paranoid. 
 
 
  76 
3.5.1.1. It is hard for some guys to, you know, to cross some barriers – men as 
unable to speak about their experiences 
As outlined previously, paranoia was often constructed broadly as an experience 
which should be shared before becoming ‘intolerable’, whilst paranoid 
experiences in men specifically, were constructed as a potential expression of 
weakness. These discursive constructions can be seen to intersect and interact 
with each other, as well as with the wider gender discourses of hegemonic 
masculinity that espouse the control of emotion, and privilege rationality (Connell, 
2005). As a result, a ‘paranoid man’ might find themselves problematised within 
multiple subject positions, having to maintain emotional control and rationality, 
whilst simultaneously being positioned as irrational and weak. 
 
Carlos: Yeah. I mean it is hard for some guys to, you know, to cross some 
barriers, to say ‘hey I’m worried that I’m not enough and my girlfriend 
might leave me’, ‘hey I’m worried that, you know, my parent might pass 
away if they’re ill’. <Interviewer: Mmm> Erm you know, ‘I’m terrified of 
dying’ (332-334). 
 
In this example, Carlos suggests several possible fears, which he states would 
be “hard for some guys” to talk about, describing this as having to “cross some 
barriers”. Interestingly, these fears are all described in quite embodied and 
emotional terms, as being “worried” and “terrified”, and thus do appear to 
contradict ideas of strength, control, and rationality, that are frequent elements of 
construction of masculinity (Connell, 2005).  
 
This limit on men expressing paranoia appears to link to the discourse of 
paranoia in men discussed earlier in section 3.3.1.4, where it is portrayed as an 
experience suppressed until exploding. The subject position of ‘paranoid man’ 
appears to allow more for these forms of expression of paranoia, as a strong 
burst of aggression, rather than as something more akin to a calm expression of 
doubt. In this way, paranoia can be expressed by a man, without the 
connotations of weakness or emotionality that are commonly rejected from 
hegemonic masculinity. 
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3.5.1.2. “I mean they’re less like aggressive than men” - Women as unable to be 
aggressively paranoid 
In a similar way to the limits placed on ‘male’ expressions of paranoia, the subject 
position of ‘paranoid woman’ appears to place restrictions on the expression of 
paranoia by women. Within the interviews, as outlined previously, there was a 
common construction of women as vulnerable and less aggressive, compared 
with the aggressive and scary male (Hollander, 2001). These discourses 
appeared to limit what behaviour was expected and permitted of a woman 
experiencing paranoia, in that she would have to break gendered norms of 
behaviour constructed as part of gendered subjectivity. 
 
Simon: Women. Yeah. They do talk more about their issues and stuff like 
that. They seem to have better, they have more empathy… I mean they’re 
less like aggressive than men. So that sort of, that testosterone I know 
leads to aggression (154-157). 
 
In this extract, Simon directly constructs women as having “more empathy” and 
being “less aggressive”. He draws on these ideas to position women as talking 
more about their issues. In this way, a paranoid woman is positioned in such a 
way as to render expressions of aggression as less expected or understandable, 
potentially problematising any women who expressed a form of paranoia in this 
way. 
 
Adila: I think women are more sly sort of a thing in that sense. I think they 
observe more quietly. More on the sly. [laughs]. They do their research. 
They do their homework [laughs] (191-192).  
 
Here Adila also constructs and positions women as expressing paranoia in a 
different way to men. She positions the paranoid women as “more sly” and 
“observ[ing] more quietly”. This interestingly portrays a women as acting quite 
intelligently and rationally, traits commonly constructed more as ‘masculine’, 
however in Adila’s description these are expressed in a way that is more hidden. 
This suggests a way of a woman navigating around the discourses of paranoia 
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and gender that normally prevent and restrict expressions of paranoia in a more 
‘male’ way. 
 
3.5.1.3. “that kinda like urban black youth” – positioning of young black men 
A final consideration of practice and subjectivity, concerns the impact of 
intersectionality. When interviewees were asked about how expectations or 
opinions related to the vignette might change if the subject was a young black 
man, the answers given gave interesting insights into the potential impact of 
discourse on subjectivity. Young black men were spoken of as likely to 
experience paranoia, and were positioned as having more reasons to be 
paranoid, due to experiences of discrimination and police victimisation. 
 
Bilal: [2] I think you know, if I were to just pull out the like, you know, the 
stereotypical paranoid male sufferer in my head, he’s definitely like, he’s 
definitely, John is in my mind black <Interviewer: Right mmm>. Erm you 
know. That’s what you know, that kinda like urban black youth is who I 
think struggles most with paranoia (260-264). 
 
In this extract, Bilal states that a young black man is for him the “stereotypical 
paranoid male sufferer”. He positions “black youth” as those who “struggles most 
with paranoia”. The positioning of young black men in this way, as likely to suffer 
from paranoia, appears contradictory in terms of on one hand acknowledging the 
reality of discrimination, but on the other still framing subsequent experiences as 
‘paranoid’. 
 
Adila: It’s my perception is that erm black people have toughened up 
themselves … So they don’t fear when it’s one to one. But they would fear 
obviously if it would be in a large sort of a scale (299-302). 
 
Here Adila speaks of her opinion that “black people have toughened up”, 
subsequently suggesting a form of higher tolerance for fear. Positioning a black 
person in this way raises potential questions in terms of the impact on 
subjectivity, through possibly increasing the threshold of what could be 
considered an ‘understandable fear’ and an acceptable expression of paranoia. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter will discuss the findings of the analytic process, presenting these 
within the framework of the original research questions and wider gender and 
paranoia literature. Following this, the quality of the present study will be 
evaluated, along with a critical review of the methodological and analytical 
choices made. The chapter will then conclude with a discussion of implications, 
both in terms of research and clinical practice. 
 
4.2. Research Questions and Analysis Summary 
 
The overall aims of the present study were to explore discursive constructions of 
paranoia and gender, the resultant availability of subject positions, and 
subsequent consequences for subjectivity and practice. This section of the thesis 
will further explore and discuss the findings of the analysis, in relation to these 
aims and the research questions, and in the context of existing research 
literature. 
 
4.2.1. What are the culturally available discourses around gender and paranoia? 
 
‘Psychosis like’ experiences, including paranoia, can be considered to lie across 
a continuum from normal phenomena, to those that can be considered highly 
distressing and of clinical severity (van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000). This 
appeared to manifest within the discursive constructions apparent in the 
interviews of the present study, in the distinction between constructions of more 
normalised experiences and those of a more severe and abnormal nature. 
However, as opposed to being constructed by interviewees as an acceptable 
experience across the continuum, severe and abnormal paranoia appeared to 
reflect a point in which experiences had crossed over into being considered ‘too 
much’, or judged as unacceptable. These judgments appeared to be made based 
on the perceived plausibility of beliefs, the perceived basis in reality, and level 
and intensity of fear. Experiences of paranoia considered as having passed this 
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point of normality, appeared to be subsequently judged as out of control, scary, 
maladaptive, and bizarre. These findings provide further support for discursive 
models of fear and threat, that identify the socially constructed nature of 
acceptable fear (Lupton & Tulloch, 1999), and the processes by which others 
judge fear as unwarranted or paranoid (Simpson, 1996). 
 
In further consideration of discursive constructions of experiences, analysis of 
interviews highlighted an intersecting with gender discourses of masculinity and 
femininity. These intersections were most apparent in the way that paranoid 
experiences could potentially be constructed differently for men and women, 
leading to differing judgements of when paranoia was considered to have 
progressed up the continuum of experiences. For experiences of paranoia in 
men, the most prevalent constructions were of an experience based in vigilance 
for external and physical threats, or related to status, that manifested as an 
uncontrollable and unpredictable expression, judged by others as scary or 
aggressive. In contrast, paranoid experiences in women were constructed in a 
more normalising way, as related to expectations of women as worriers and as 
concerned about intimate and social relationships, or to experiences of street 
harassment, likely to be expressed in an open manner and easily shared with 
others. These differences in constructions draw heavily upon culturally familiar 
discourses of masculinity as controlled and unemotional (Connell, 2005), and as 
aggressive (Hollander, 2001), and of femininity as more emotional (Barrett, 
Robin, Pietromonaco, & Eyssell, 1998; Lutz, 1990), and socially expressive 
(Coates, 1997). 
 
In contrast to this more gendered notion of paranoia, constructions found and 
utilised in Clinical Psychology research and practice are commonly more 
ungendered in nature, or appear to draw more broadly from what has been 
identified here as the more ‘male’ construction, with a predominant focus on the 
potential for harm. For example, the definition provided by Freeman and Garety 
(2000) refers to how the “individual believes that harm is occurring”, throughout 
each of its criteria, along with how “Harm only to friends or relatives does not 
count”. Similarly, within the DSM-5 the definition of persecutory delusions is given 
as “belief that one is going to be harmed, harassed, and so forth by an individual, 
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organization, or other group” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 87). 
The DSM-5 defines paranoid ideation as experiences “involving suspiciousness 
or the belief that one is being harassed, persecuted, or unfairly treated”, 
representing some consideration of forms of suspicion not related directly to 
harm. However, this serves to construct the experience as ‘ideation’ in a way that 
suggests a lesser or more normalised experience. Broadly speaking therefore, it 
can be hypothesised that defining paranoia in terms of what has been identified 
in the present study as the more male discursive construction of paranoid 
experiences, may lead to experiences of paranoia in line with the more female 
construction as potentially becoming more normalised or disregarded within both 
research and clinical practice. 
 
A further finding relates to the prevalence of constructions of paranoia as a 
‘sense’ or feeling, linked to anxiety, and as transient and temporary in nature. 
These ideas were most associated with constructions of paranoid experiences 
that were normalised in nature, contrasting with constructions of a more 
persistent and out of control or abnormal experience of paranoia. In addition, 
interviewees reported these experiences as occurring along with an engaging in 
a process of “what if?” and “is this real?” style thinking. This experience of 
paranoid subjectivity, as a pairing of embodied experiences with an element of 
inner speech, has previously been articulated by Cromby and Harper (2009). 
They describe paranoid subjectivity as “a constant iteration between socialised 
feelings and socially derived inner speech”, emphasising how this movement 
between the two occurs within and in relation to social context. Within Cognitive 
approaches, the process of inner speech has been considered in terms of a 
reappraisal of thoughts, and a process of reality testing (Taylor, Graves & Stopa, 
2009). The beneficial or adversarial nature of this inner speech is contested, with 
some studies demonstrating this as a helpful process, and others describing it as 
part of the paranoid subjectivity itself, or associating it with an increase in the 
severity of experiences of paranoia (Aggelidou & Georgaca, 2017), pointing to 
area potentially needing future research.  
 
Following on from the above, experiences of paranoia that were constructed as 
more severe and abnormal, were described within interviews as in some way a 
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product of failing to express oneself, and subsequently a resultant build up or 
snowball of associated emotions. In this way, the construction of paranoia drew 
upon common discourses and metaphors of emotions, as a hydraulic like system 
that requires a form of venting. These ideas are commonly found within the 
discourse of anger, and within psychoanalytic and cognitive therapies (Lutz & 
White, 1986). A suppression of paranoid thoughts, especially in the context of 
high anxiety, has been associated with increased severity of experiences (Jones 
& Fernyhough, 2008), whilst acceptance of paranoid thinking and expression of 
emotions are considered helpful and adaptive coping strategies (Aggelidou & 
Georgaca, 2017). Interestingly however, these metaphors have been critiqued for 
narrowing focus purely to the releasing of emotional experiences, and thus 
neglecting the social and communicative aspects or functions (Lutz & White, 
1986). Analysis of interviews in the present study suggest that whereas in the 
construction of experiences of paranoia considered more acceptable or 
normalised interviewees gave some consideration to the potentially 
communicative nature of the experience, this was rendered less so when 
paranoia was judged as abnormal or severe. Constructing more severe 
experiences of paranoia in this way may potentially obscure and mystify the 
meaning within individual experiences. 
 
In addition to being described as an emotional experience requiring expression, 
paranoia was also constructed as an experience to be spoken about and 
checked out with others. More severe or abnormal experiences of paranoia were 
subsequently implicated as a failure to do this. This appears to draw upon 
discourses of reality testing, in which a further behavioural norm is constructed of 
a willingness to share and evaluate one’s own experiences. Within psychological 
discourses, this would commonly be considered the use of disconfirmatory 
evidence, to modify beliefs, a component of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for 
paranoia (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002). However, 
critics of this notion, such as Georgaca (2004), describe how this process more 
reflects the co-construction of ‘reality’ in interpersonal dialogue, as opposed to a 
process of reality testing, wherein “not only the plausibility of the account, but 
also the rationality, integrity, and accountability of the participants is at stake”. 
Taking this view would suggest that further research could be useful in expanding 
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existing knowledge in how this process occurs, and to what extent discussing 
beliefs with others influences the paranoid experience. 
 
4.2.2. How do such discourses construct subjectivity and position ‘paranoid’ men 
and women differently? 
 
Following on from the first research question, this second question considers how 
the discursive constructions of paranoia and gender are deployed and make 
available the subject positions of ‘paranoid man’ and ‘paranoid woman’. 
Additionally, it considers the consequences of these for subjectivity or the 
experience and practice of men and women positioned as paranoid. 
 
The discursive construction of abnormal or severe paranoia as an experience 
that had built up and not been expressed, appeared to intersect with gender 
discourses, constructing male paranoia as an experience difficult to express and 
associated with self-doubt and weakness. Contrary to this, female experiences of 
paranoia were spoken of as expressed more freely. In addition, male paranoia 
was felt to build up and then be released in an angry or aggressive manner, 
whilst female paranoia was constructed as a more open experience, released at 
a lower-level. These constructions appear to draw upon intersections of the 
discourses of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005), female emotionality (Lutz, 
1990), and that of paranoia. The constructions position men and women 
differently, in terms of their ability to express and speak about paranoid 
experiences. Within these discourses, logic and rationality is constructed as 
masculine, whilst emotionality is constructed as feminine and subsequently 
rejected from hegemony (Connell, 2005), subsequently positioning women as the 
emotional and irrational sex (Lutz, 1990). As a result, men who express or 
acknowledge emotion, or self-doubt, in a non-masculine way, can find 
themselves as Connell (2005) says, “expelled from the circle of legitimacy”, or in 
more Foucauldian terms as problematised. 
 
In terms of consequences for the subjectivity of paranoid men, use of more 
interpersonal and emotional coping strategies is likely to necessitate a process of 
renegotiating one’s masculine identity around these problematisations (Wetherell 
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& Edley, 2014). This potentially limits the ability for men to utilise interpersonal 
and social coping strategies, identified as helpful in reducing paranoid 
experiences (Freeman, Garety & Kuipers, 2001; Yamauchi, Sudo, & Tanno, 
2009), as well as increasing the likelihood of suppression or avoidance, shown to 
be correlated with increased experiences (Jones & Fernyhough, 2008). 
Additionally, analysis of interviews demonstrated how experiences of paranoia in 
men could be constructed as an unpredictable, explosion of anger. It can be 
hypothesised that this results from the limiting, within discourse, of men’s ability 
to express paranoia in what would be considered a more female manner, 
resulting in an expectation for this to be expressed in a way more consistent with 
the construction of men as aggressive (Hollander, 2001). When considering the 
consequences for women of being positioned in this way, it may be that there is 
an increase in the ability to utilise social and relational coping strategies, 
identified potentially as protective for women (Morgan, Castle & Jablensky, 
2008), without the negative connotations experienced by men. However, there 
also appears to be an element of normalisation of women’s experiences, leading 
a certain level of dismissal of the possible impact, as well as a potential 
problematisation of women who use ‘male’ ways of expressing paranoia, such as 
through aggressive of controlling acts. 
 
Intersections between gender, and paranoia discourses also occurred in that 
different fears were constructed as primarily the concern of either men or women. 
This process of positioning fears as more male or more female raises interesting 
considerations for the subjectivity of the ‘paranoid man’ and ‘paranoid woman’. 
An example of this concerned the description of fear of street harassment as a 
“female feeling”, positioning this as something women experience and men would 
only experience in more obviously or severely dangerous situations. Gender 
discourses commonly position people in this way, with women as positioned as 
vulnerable, and men as dangerous (Hollander, 2001). Brown (1998) describes 
the apparent disparity between women’s fear of public space, and the relatively 
higher risk of violence towards men. She points out the subtler consequences of 
harassment, and more embodied effects of gendered experiences in public 
space, describing women’s experiences of always being seen or as under the 
gaze of men. Mehta and Bondi (1999) highlight how these discrepancies lead to 
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women adopting a position of “being sensible” in which there is an awareness of 
threat and some adjustment to behaviour, without this becoming something 
judged or positioned as irrational. It appears therefore that the intersecting of 
discourse creates a subject position for women to take up, in which there can be 
acknowledgement of fear in public space, however straying into too much fear or 
an irrational response, leads to being positioned more as ‘paranoid’. 
 
This concept of ‘too much’ fear also appeared relevant for the subjectivity of men 
experiencing paranoia. Constructions of paranoia in men portrayed the 
experience as having a potential to cross a threshold from something considered 
more acceptable, into a more dangerous or scary experience, as a consequence 
of a form of build-up, or related to the presence of external threats. Men were 
positioned as likely to express paranoia of this nature in a dangerous, 
unpredictable and out of control manner, with connotations of aggression. The 
discourse of men as violent or aggressive has been well documented previously, 
with violence constructed as something ‘men do’ and as ‘fact of life’ (Hollander, 
2001). Seymour (2011) follows on from this in pointing out the cultural 
acceptance of men’s violence towards men in some circumstances, and the 
problematisation of men’s violence in others. They quote Hearn and McKie 
(2010) “Men are supposed to know when and where, and to whom they may be 
violent”. This appears to be important to the subjectivity of men, whereby some 
expression of awareness of external threats is considered acceptable and within 
the common constructions of masculine norms. However, experiencing ‘too 
much’ external threat can lead to being judged as irrational and paranoid. 
 
A further interesting finding related to the subjectivity of paranoia, concerns 
associated emotional experiences. Paranoia was frequently constructed as an 
experience related to the effect of social pressures, as well as a result of a failure 
to meet these expectations. This was presented as especially the case for 
paranoia in men, which was felt to be related to the effect of gendered 
expectations, status, and the impact of the ‘male role’. In this way, paranoia was 
constructed as related feelings of inferiority or inadequacy, and subsequent 
experiences of shame. As an emotional experience, ‘external shame’ related to 
belief of being held negatively in the minds of others, has been shown to 
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correlate with experiences of paranoia (Matos, Pinto‐Gouveia, & Gilbert, 2013). 
Cromby and Harper (2009) point to the nature of shame as an emotion related to 
evaluation of self in relation to others, as well as an experience that for men is in 
itself shaming as a consequent of prohibition by cultural norms. They further posit 
that experiences of shame may be ‘bypassed’ and projected into ‘paranoia’ 
oriented towards the hostile intentions of an other. 
 
4.2.3. What is the role of intersectionality, in impacting constructions of paranoid 
men and women? 
 
Shields (2008) defines intersectionality in terms of how “one category of identity, 
such as gender, takes its meaning as a category in relation to another category”. 
In this way, the discourse of gender can be described as unavoidably involved 
with other social practices and structures, and can only be understood in terms of 
other forms of discourse, such as race and culture. Therefore, in answering this 
research question, this section will discuss the effects of intersectionality on the 
discursive constructions of paranoia and gender drawn upon in interviews. 
 
Within interviews, participants described a view that young black men might 
experience more paranoia than young white men, due to the impact of racial 
discrimination, and associations with crime and ‘urban’ culture. The notion of a 
link between experiences of racism and paranoia is supported within the 
literature. In a general population study conducted in America by Combs, Penn 
and Fenigstein (2002), it was found that black Americans scored higher on a 
paranoia scale than non-Hispanic white Americans. Paranoia has been 
associated with racial microagressions, in creating what has been described as a 
‘healthy paranoia’ amongst black Americans, wherein racism is anticipated (Sue, 
Capodilupo, & Holder, 2008). Evidence of interviewees drawing on these ideas 
within interviews is interesting, as experiences were still often framed as 
paranoid, as opposed to being explicitly described as justified by experiences of 
racism and discrimination. Whilst this positioning may be a consequence of 
participant orientation towards the interview topic of paranoia (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005), it may also be a consequence of the cultureless nature of the construct of 
paranoia (Harper, 2014). 
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In addition to the above, young black men were constructed at times during 
interviews as “tough” and “fearless”. Connell (2005) points to how masculinity is 
constructed in intersection with race, culture and class, creating a multiplicity of 
forms of ‘white masculinity’ and ‘black masculinity’. The construction of black men 
as tough appears to point towards this element of intersectionality, and raises 
questions about the subjectivity of black men. In being constructed as tough and 
fearless, a higher threshold of acceptable fear is formed, wherein a greater threat 
level is needed to justify a fear, potentially influencing the possibility of an 
experience being judged as paranoid in nature. This notion is supported by the 
work of Lupton and Tullock (1999), who describe fear of crime as a product of 
subjectivity and as “constituted through the discourses of a number of 
subcultures or social collectives of which individuals are members”. They point to 
how disparities between subjectivities can lead to judgments of irrational fear 
from others.  
 
A final element of intersectionality present during the analysis concerned the 
impact of gender roles and expectations. Participants from different cultural 
backgrounds constructed the gendered roles of men and women in subtly 
different ways, raising questions related to the resulting effects of subjectivity. For 
example, a female interviewee from a Muslim background spoke of women as 
oppressed in relationships by men and male jealously, whilst a female 
interviewee from a white British background constructed women as more jealous 
than men. Whilst these disparities may reflect individual and more subtle 
differences, they also may be reflected of broader differences in the cultural 
construction of gender. These ideas are however based on small numbers of 
comments within interviews, from specific interviewees, and are therefore 
speculative in nature. Future research related to this area is therefore needed. 
 
4.3. Critical Review and Research Evaluation 
 
This section of the discussion chapter will now critically review and evaluate the 
research presented in this thesis. In order to do this, the guiding principles 
outlined by Spencer and Richie (2012) will be drawn upon, in considering the 
credibility, rigour, contribution, and reflexivity of the research. 
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4.3.1. Credibility 
 
Credibility refers to “the defensibility and plausibility of claims made by the 
research”, concerning the “believability” of findings as well as “the ability to see 
how claims have been reached” (Spencer and Richie, 2012). In this way, the 
credibility of qualitative research could also be considered its interpretive validity. 
To maintain credibility, the analytic process has been described in detail 
throughout, along with examples of coded transcripts provided in the appendices 
(Appendix G). Throughout the analysis chapter, analytic comments have been 
presented alongside example quotations, in order to provide transparency and to 
support the interpretive claims made (Yardley, 2008). The plausibility of the 
claims made has been demonstrated by discussing interpretations in the context 
of existing research (Spencer and Richie, 2012). Lastly, in order to maintain 
interpretive validity, conflicting or contrasting discursive constructions were 
presented where indicated, acknowledging the often contradictory nature of 
discourse (Parker, 1992). 
 
4.3.2. Rigour 
 
In qualitative research evaluation, rigour can be seen as synonymous with 
methodological validity, concerning the appropriateness of research decisions, 
dependability of evidence and the overall conduct of research (Spencer & Richie, 
2012). In order to maintain and demonstrate vigour, efforts have been made 
throughout the thesis to present each stage of the research process, as well as to 
detail the rationale behind key decisions. Additional consideration of 
methodological limitations is giving in a separate section later in this chapter. 
 
4.3.3. Contribution 
 
Contribution refers to the extent to which the study addresses the research 
questions and contributes towards wider knowledge and understanding, as well 
as clinical practice (Spencer & Richie (2012). A full discussion of the contributions 
made by this study towards wider knowledge and understanding are presented in 
the implications section later in this chapter. 
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In terms of addressing the research questions, data collected during interview 
provided more limited information regarding intersectionality than was expected 
during the design of the study. Whilst some interesting information was gathered 
related to the positioning of black men, and cultural differences in constructions of 
gender roles, these were somewhat limited in depth. It could be hypothesised 
that issues of race and class are harder to discuss within an interview setting, 
wherein the interaction is more formalised and the researcher is positioned in 
terms of ‘footing’ as more powerful than the interviewee (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005).  
 
4.3.4. Reflexivity 
 
Reflexivity refers to an awareness of the influence that the researcher has in the 
shaping of the research process, both personally, and as a theorist or thinker 
(Willig, 2013). It acknowledges that the research process is open to a number of 
potential influences, and asks questions of the values and assumptions that 
guided the project throughout (Spencer & Richie (2012). In terms of my own 
interest in this subject, as a man myself I have an interest in the impact 
discourses of masculinity have on men’s experiences of psychological distress. 
My initial interest in this specific project came from knowledge of research that 
pointed towards men reporting more experiences of paranoia in the general 
population. However, upon reading further into associated literature, and 
engaging in conversations with my thesis supervisor, my standpoint on the topic 
moved beyond considering these experiences in relation solely to masculine 
norms, and towards considering the more nuanced aspects of gender discourses 
in the broader sense (e.g. Wetherell & Edley, 2014), as well as the experiences 
of women, and the role of intersectionality.  
 
In terms of the data collection and analytic process, it is important to consider the 
impact my being a white, middle class man may have had on the process. As 
interviews are inherently dialogical encounters (Potter & Hepburn, 2005), the 
context of both participants and researcher is important. It may be that my 
context unintentionally limited what could be said within interviews, in that 
conversations with an interviewer of different class, race, or gender, may have 
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opened different avenues of conversation. For example, male interviewees may 
have felt cautious around speaking contrary to stereotypically masculine ideas or 
discourses, due to concerns about judgment from me as the interviewer. 
Likewise, female interviewees may have potentially opened up more about 
personal experiences to a fellow female interviewer. Additionally, whilst 
throughout analysis I endeavoured to maintain awareness of my context, and 
how this had the potential to influence my interpretations, it is important to 
consider how my gender may have influenced the analytic process. Being male 
potentially may have limited the range of interpretations considered during the 
analytic process, through biasing towards certain discourses of gender and 
constructions of masculinity and femininity, leaving other potentially more 
subordinated ideas less visible.  
 
4.4. Research Limitations 
 
A number of potential methodological limitations arose during the conducting of 
the research, and will be discussed below in the context of decisions taken in the 
overall design of the research. 
 
4.4.1. The use of interviews in data collection 
 
The use of semi-structured interviews was deemed the most appropriate way to, 
in a general population study, collect data pertaining to discursive constructions 
of paranoia and gender and processes of subjectification. Semi-structured 
interviews do however present limitations, as outlined by Potter and Hepburn 
(2005). Interviews are themselves dialogical interactions, in which both 
participants have a ‘stake’, and therefore cannot be considered discursively 
neutral or free from bias. Interviews can be critiqued for implicit ‘cognitivist’ 
assumptions that reports provided by interviewees can provide a transparent 
reflection of the experiences, events and emotional responses under discussion 
(Potter & Hepburn, 2005). In the present study, this was felt to be unavoidable, as 
naturally occurring text or dialogue was not practicable as a data collection 
method. However, this potential limitation was considered throughout the 
discussion of findings and implications. 
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4.4.2. Choice of participants 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters of the thesis, a student population was chosen 
for this study, due to the high prevalence of paranoid experiences reported in this 
population (Ellett, Lopes & Chadwick, 2003). However, the choice of this group 
as an example of the ‘general population’ is not without potential criticisms. Whilst 
this study was not aiming for generalisability to wider populations in the more 
quantitative sense (Willig, 2013), it is important to note that student populations 
are a slightly more homogenised population, in comparison with samples of 
general population (Peterson, 2001). Additionally, it is important to consider the 
impact of all participants being Psychology students. This may have occurred due 
to the recruitment strategy, and high proportion of Psychology students on the 
campus in which recruitment occurred, or as a result of more Psychology 
students being aware of and willing to discuss the construct of paranoia. Potter 
and Hepburn (2005) point to the need to consider the ‘stake’ of interviewer and 
interviewees. With the researcher as a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology student, 
and the participants as Psychology post-graduate and undergraduates, both can 
be said to have a stake in the use of psychological language and constructs, 
potentially limiting the discourses drawn upon, or risking the reproduction of 
psychological constructs within interviews. Despite being drawn from a student 
population, the age range of interviewees was broader than expected, ranging 
from 18 to 40. However, utilising participants of this age range limits the 
discourses of gender drawn upon in interviews. Individuals of an older and 
younger age than this range are likely to draw upon generationally different ideas 
and discourses around gender, masculinity and femininity, as well as different 
attitudes and understandings around mental health difficulties. Additionally, as 
outlined in the method chapter of this thesis, there was a difficulty in recruiting 
male participants to interviews, resulting in fewer male than female participants. 
This difference limits the potential examples of paranoia in men drawn upon in 
the analytic process, as well as potentially narrowing the discourses of 
masculinity considered. Finally, it is important to note that the number of 
interviewees who agreed to participate was relatively small, meaning a certain 
level of caution is required regarding broader interpretations. 
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4.4.3. Choice of epistemology and analytic method 
 
The decision to utilise a moderate or critical realist social constructionist 
epistemology was taken in order to allow for a consideration of connections 
between discursive constructions of paranoia and gender within interviews, and 
the wider social-cultural discourses that are drawn upon, and exist independent 
of what is said (Parker, 1992; Willig, 2013). In accordance with this position, and 
with the research questions, Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) (Arribas-
Ayllon, & Walkerdine, 2008; Willig, 2013) was chosen as the analytic method, 
due to its use in going beyond identifying discursive constructions, and answering 
questions related to subjectification and subjectivity (van Langenhove & Harre, 
1999). Willig (2013) highlights debates around to the extent to which subjectivity 
can be said to relate to discourse alone, and whether other theoretical 
considerations are needed to account for the investments individuals place in 
adopting particular discursive positions. Within the present study, this can be 
seen in discussions around the ways in which individuals position themselves 
and others in relation to the discourse of paranoia, as ‘acceptably paranoid’ or as 
‘abnormally paranoid’, as well as in terms of gender, as ‘male’ and as ‘female’. To 
what extent can be this be said to occur due to availability of positions alone? To 
this end, Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine (1984 pp.203) 
advocate the incorporation of Psychoanalytic theory into discursive psychology 
and the investigation of subjectivity, a possible focus for future discursive studies 
exploring paranoia.  
 
4.5. Research Implications 
 
The findings of the present study point towards several important clinical and 
research implications. This section of the thesis will present areas for potential 
exploration in future research, as well as broader implications for research in this 
topic area. In addition, clinical implications will be considered in regard to the 
clinical practice of psychologists and therapists working in this area.  
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4.5.1. Implications for further research 
 
4.5.1.1. Paranoid subjectivity and emotional/dialogical processes 
The research presented in this thesis provides further support for the continued 
exploration of the role of internal dialogues in experiences of paranoia (Cromby & 
Harper, 2009; Georgaca, 2004). The present study demonstrated some 
examples of dialogues, both internal and external, involved in the experience of 
paranoia. These dialogues appear to be important to the overall phenomena of 
paranoia, however are not commonly a feature of the dominant cognitive models. 
It appears unclear whether these processes occur as a part of the subjective 
experience of paranoia in a potentially unhelpful way, or as part of an adaptive 
coping strategy (Aggelidou & Georgaca, 2017). Further research is needed to 
explore in more detail dialogical processes and paranoid experiences, as well as 
any potential interactions with associated embodied experiences, such as the 
extent to which dialogues occur along with emotional or embodied experiences of 
shame, anxiety, and threat. 
 
4.5.2.2. Gendered forms of distress 
The present research highlights several ways in which discursive constructions of 
paranoia are potentially gendered in nature, as well as possible effects on 
subjectivity for those positioned as a ‘paranoid man’ or ‘paranoid woman’. 
However, dominant constructs and models of paranoia utilised in research are 
broadly ungendered in nature, or predominantly focus on what this study has 
highlighted as the more ‘male’ construct of paranoid subjectivity (Freeman & 
Garety, 2000), in which there is a primary focus on ideas such as perceived harm 
from others. This may present potential consequences through the normalising or 
dismissing of other more relational, interpersonal and affective aspects of the 
experience, associated within this research with constructions of paranoid 
experiences in women. Further research should consider broadening the 
understanding of paranoia beyond purely focusing on perceived harm, giving an 
increased focus on the role of gender and the meaning of the experience for 
different groups. For example, researchers may wish to consider the type of 
measures utilised in measuring experiences of paranoia, and whether these 
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potentially capture only a narrow representation of experiences or ignore the 
gendered nature of the experience. 
 
4.5.3.4. Intersectionality, gender and paranoia 
One of the aims of the present study was to explore the role of intersectionality in 
gendered constructions of paranoia. However, whilst findings indicated some 
interesting points related to the potential differences in experiences of black men, 
and some variety in cultural constructions of gendered roles, due to the 
limitations discussed earlier this was not fully explored to the level hoped for. 
Further research may wish to consider alternative ways of investigating 
intersectionality in experiences of paranoia, through a more specifically designed 
study. Furthermore, whilst the present study elicited some discursive 
constructions of paranoia which were considered within interviews as more 
associated with either male or female experiences, future research should 
consider unpacking these constructions more. It may be important to consider the 
more nuanced aspects of gender, and the multiple forms of femininity and 
masculinity, intersected with class, race, and culture. 
 
4.5.2. Clinical implications 
 
4.5.2.1. Implications in psychological therapies for paranoia 
The dominant psychological models of paranoia continue to be those based in a 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) model, such as in that posed by Freeman, 
Garety, Kuipers Fowler and Bebbington (2002). These models, whilst useful, 
have been previously critiqued for inadequately considering the relational, 
emotional, social and embodied aspects of the experience (Cromby & Harper, 
2009). The present study, whilst small in scale, provides some additional support 
for the notion of bringing interpersonal, affective and social factors more to the 
fore in clinical work. This may be achieved though adapting cognitive models and 
formulations to include more socially based or systemic factors, such as what has 
been proposed in work with children and families (Dummett, 2006), which may be 
a potential focus for further research. Additionally, further research could consider 
the potential utility of alternative models of intervention, such as Compassion 
Focused Therapy (CFT), wherein the embodied and emotional experiences 
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associated with paranoia becomes the primary target for intervention (Lincoln, 
Hohenhaus & Hartmann, 2013); or Narrative Therapy, where attention is given 
more to how discourse impacts upon personal narratives, meanings and 
understandings of paranoid experiences (Rhodes & Jakes, 2009). 
 
4.5.2.2. Reconstructing masculinity 
The findings of the present study point towards potential ways in which the 
culturally available discourses of masculinity may limit both the expression of 
paranoid experiences in men, and the use of more relational, and emotionally 
expressive coping strategies. Whilst the impact of constructions of masculinity on 
help seeking is well known (Connell, 2005; Wong, Ho, Wang, & Miller, 2017), 
further research may wish to consider this more specifically in relation to 
experiences of paranoia. In terms of work clinically, Brooks (2010) proposes the 
development of transtheoretical and integrative approaches to therapeutic work 
with men, as a way of countering “strong aversion in males for any consideration 
of psychotherapy”. However, further work is needed to better consider the varied 
and intersecting nature of constructions of masculinity (Wetherell & Edley, 2014), 
and to develop ways of working that may increase the accessibility of therapeutic 
approaches to men.  
 
4.5.2.3. Public health implications 
Whilst the research presented in this thesis is based on interviews with a 
relatively small number of individuals, some important preventative and public 
health implications can be drawn from the analysis. Results of the present study 
provide some indication that gender based discourses related to masculinity and 
femininity may contribute to how a person’s experiences may be understood, as 
well as individual ways of expressing or responding, and subsequent likelihood or 
method of help seeking. In a recent British Psychological Society (BPS) Division 
of Clinical Psychology report on Psychosis and Schizophrenia (Cooke, 2014), 
several recommendations were made related to working at a preventative and 
public health level. Amongst these recommendations, the report suggested work 
was needed in order to promote equality and reduce discrimination related to 
gender. Similarly, a World Health Organisation (WHO, 2002) report recommends 
that gender disparities in mental health be addressed through targeting gender 
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discrimination, gender-based violence and gender-role stereotyping, though 
legislation, policies, and programmes of intervention. Further work is needed to 
explore the potential format of such interventions, and how to tailor specifically to 
experiences of paranoia. Existing programmes which may provide examples of 
such work include the Campaign Against Living Miserably (CALM), and the 
Movember Foundation in relation to men’s mental health, and the Women’s 
Mental Health Network which campaigns for more gender specific legislation and 
policy. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The present study was undertaken in response to existing research suggesting 
that more men than women experience paranoia in the general population. As 
opposed to taking a reductive approach, this study aimed to approach the topic 
from the perspective of discursive psychology, and investigate the culturally 
available discourses of ‘paranoia’ and ‘gender’. This was undertaken through 
conducting semi-structured interviews, analysed utilising Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis (FDA). The findings of the study demonstrated ways in which discourses 
of paranoia can reflect opposing ends of a continuum of experiences, as well as 
how these discourses can be gendered in nature. The study also demonstrated 
ways in which men and women can be positioned differently within the 
intersecting discourses of paranoia and gender, along with highlighting the 
gendered nature of paranoid subjectivity. Implications of these findings suggest 
that considerations of gender should be brought more to the fore in research and 
clinical practice, in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
experience of paranoia. 
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Appendix A – Interview Schedule 
 
1) Understanding:   
 Have you heard the term ‘paranoia’ used? What does it mean to you? Can you 
think of any examples of it? 
 (Working definition for study: Paranoia has been defined as “a way of perceiving 
and relating to other people and to the world that is characterized by some 
degree of suspicion, mistrust or hostility”). 
 Briefly discuss continuum: from everyday experiences >> more 
distressing/interfering with life 
 
2) Gender: 
 Some studies suggest that men score higher on measures of paranoia than 
women.  
o Do you think this is true? If so, what might explain it? 
o What comes to mind when you think about a ‘paranoid’ man? Or 
‘paranoid’ woman? 
 Do you think men and women might just experience paranoia differently?  
o Can you think of examples of men being paranoid? 
o Can you think of examples of women being paranoid? 
o If different, what might be the reasons their experiences might be 
different? 
 
2) Share vignette: 
 What do you think about this person’s experiences? 
o Do you feel this person’s experience was in any way affected by their 
gender, race, culture, social status etc? 
o Could their experience be different if they were a young black 
man/woman/from a richer/poorer family? 
o Would your impression/interpretation of their experiences be any 
different?  
 
3) Are there ever any times where paranoia/suspiciousness in a man is appropriate or 
warranted? 
o Would this be the same or different for women? 
o What would be a sign things had tipped over into something where the feelings 
might interfere with one’s life and cause problems with mental health? 
 
4) Some studies suggest more men than women are interested in conspiracy theories.  
o Do you think this is true?  If so, why do you think this is?  
o Do you think there is anything about being a man, about masculinity that makes 
men more prone to feeling paranoid or women less prone? 
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Appendix B – Interview Vignette 
 
John is 18 and lives at home in North East London with his mum and younger sister. John 
remembers his parents always arguing when he was a child, and his dad eventually left 
the family when he was 9. John’s mum has since struggled to get by, due to problems 
with money, the family have had to move frequently and are currently living in 
temporary accommodation. John has always found school difficult and has been labeled 
‘disruptive’ and excluded on a number of occasions. He often has argued with his 
teachers, and constantly felt ‘got at by them’. 
 
Since John was a teenager, he has often worried about his family being unsafe or in 
danger. John believed the family might be being targeted by gangs in the local area, and 
that his father might have caused this. John would spend a lot of time watching people 
walking past the flat and around the area, taking note if he had seen them before and 
noticing that they would often stare at him. When he was around 16, John started to 
find it more anxiety provoking and threatening to be out, worrying that people had been 
tasked to attack or kidnap him. More recently, John feels that his family could be all 
under surveillance by the government, gangs, or both. He feels people could have 
installed surveillance equipment to monitor his phone, and cameras in the flat before 
they moved in. John also strongly suspects that the police are also involved, he has been 
stopped and searched several times and remembers how this even used to happen 
when he was younger. 
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Appendix C – Confirmation of Ethical Approval 
 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
NOTICE OF ETHICS REVIEW DECISION  
 
For research involving human participants 
BSc/MSc/MA/Professional Doctorates in Clinical, Counselling and Educational 
Psychology 
 
 
REVIEWER: Jenni Brown 
 
SUPERVISOR:  David Harper 
 
COURSE: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
STUDENT: Elliot Huggins 
 
TITLE OF PROPOSED STUDY: Gender and the Construction of Paranoid Experiences in 
the General Population 
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1. APPROVED: Ethics approval for the above named research study has been 
granted from the date of approval (see end of this notice) to the date it is 
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2. APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE 
THE RESEARCH COMMENCES (see Minor Amendments box below): In 
this circumstance, re-submission of an ethics application is not required but 
the student must confirm with their supervisor that all minor amendments 
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for their records. The supervisor will then forward the student’s confirmation 
to the School for its records.  
 
3. NOT APPROVED, MAJOR AMENDMENTS AND RE-SUBMISSION 
REQUIRED (see Major Amendments box below): In this circumstance, a 
revised ethics application must be submitted and approved before any 
research takes place. The revised application will be reviewed by the same 
reviewer. If in doubt, students should ask their supervisor for support in 
revising their ethics application.  
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DECISION ON THE ABOVE-NAMED PROPOSED RESEARCH STUDY 
(Please indicate the decision according to one of the 3 options above) 
 
 
Approved with minor amendment 
 
 
Minor amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
 
It would be better to give the participants a cut-off point to withdraw their data if they 
choose (e.g. within 2 weeks of taking part) as they will not know when analysis has 
started 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO RESEACHER (for reviewer) 
 
If the proposed research could expose the researcher to any of kind of emotional, 
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x 
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This reviewer has assessed the ethics application for the named research study 
on behalf of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
 
Confirmation of making the above minor amendments (for students): 
 
I have noted and made all the required minor amendments, as stated above, before 
starting my research and collecting data. 
 
Student’s name (Typed name to act as signature): Elliot Huggins 
Student number: u1438308     
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(Please submit a copy of this decision letter to your supervisor with this box completed, if 
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PLEASE NOTE:  
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School of Psychology (acting on behalf of the UEL Research Ethics Committee), 
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Appendix D – Participant Information Sheet 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
School of Psychology 
Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
 
The Principal Investigator(s) 
Elliot Huggins 
u1438308@uel.ac.uk 
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to consider in 
deciding whether to participate in this research study. The study is being conducted as part of my 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at the University of East London. 
 
What is this study called? 
 “Suspicious Minds: a study about gender and paranoia” 
 
What is it about? 
The term ‘paranoia’ is used a lot in everyday talk.  Sometimes people use it to refer to ordinary 
everyday experiences of wariness when there might be a good reason for this.  At other times it 
may be used to refer to someone who is convinced others are out to get them in some way even if 
there doesn’t seem to be strong evidence of this.  If severe this could affect their mental health.  
There is some evidence that, although both men and women can experience these feelings, that it 
might be more common in men.  I am interested in your views about this.  The study is open to all 
whether they have experienced these feelings themselves or not. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
If you choose to participate in this study you will be invited to take part in an interview, to discuss 
how paranoia is understood and what people think about possible gender differences.  You will 
not be asked to share any personal experiences (e.g. whether you have ever felt paranoid yourself) 
but you will be asked to share your views about the topic (e.g. what you understand by it?  What 
you think might be the reasons for possible gender differences etc).  Interviews will take place at 
UEL Stratford campus and will last approximately 60-90 minutes. 
 
It is unlikely that taking part in an interview will be upsetting but, if it is, you are free to take a 
break or leave the interview at any time. The researcher will be available to answer any questions 
or queries that you may have. 
 
Will what I say be confidential? 
Recordings of interviews will be stored, typed up and saved in password-protected files on a 
password protected computer. No details which might identify you (eg your name) will be 
included in the transcript of the discussion.  A pseudonym will be used in place of participants’ 
names in order to protect confidentiality. Following completion of the study and submission of 
the project, audio recordings will be erased. Anonymised transcripts may be kept beyond this 
point, in order for further analysis and publication of the research. 
 
 
Where will the study take place? 
The study will take place at the Stratford campus of the University of East London. 
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Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study and should not feel coerced. You are free to 
withdraw at any time. Should you choose to withdraw from the study you may do so without 
disadvantage to yourself and without any obligation to give a reason. Should you withdraw once 
analysis has started, the researcher reserves the right to use your anonymised data in the write-up 
of the study and any further analysis that may be conducted by the researcher. 
 
Please feel free to ask me any questions. If you are happy to continue you will be asked to sign a 
consent form prior to your participation. Please retain this invitation letter for reference.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been conducted, please contact the 
study’s supervisor Dr David Harper, School of Psychology, University of East London, Water 
Lane, London E15 4LZ. D.harper@uel.ac.uk 
or  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr. Mary Spiller, School of 
Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. 
(Tel: 020 8223 4004. Email: m.j.spiller@uel.ac.uk) 
 
 
Thank you in anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Elliot Huggins 
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Appendix E – Participant Consent Form 
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
Consent to participate in a research study  
 
“Suspicious Minds: a study about gender and paranoia” 
 
I have the read the information sheet relating to the above research study and have been 
given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been explained to me, 
and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about this 
information. I understand what is being proposed and the procedures in which I will be 
involved have been explained to me. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, 
will remain strictly confidential. Only the researcher(s) involved in the study will have 
access to identifying data.  
 
It has been explained to me what will happen once the research study has been 
completed. I understand that the researcher will use quotes from interviews in the write 
up of this study, but that all names and identifying details will be replaced with 
pseudonyms. 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully 
explained to me. Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time without disadvantage to myself and without being obliged to 
give any reason. I also understand that should I withdraw once analysis has begun, the 
researcher reserves the right to use my anonymous data in the write-up of the study and in 
any further analysis that may be conducted by the researcher. 
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Participant’s Signature  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher’s Signature  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Date: ……………………..…… 
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Appendix F – Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
Debrief Information Sheet 
 
 “Suspicious Minds: a study about gender and paranoia” 
 
Thank you for participating in this research study. Your contributions during the 
interview were very much appreciated. 
 
This research project aimed to explore whether there was a relationship between gender 
and paranoia. We were interested in the way in which paranoia might be talked about and 
discussed within an interview setting. Analysis of the discussion will aim to make links 
between what was said and wider ideas about gender and paranoia. 
 
Where can I go for further support? 
If you feel affected by any issues raised during the interview today and would like further 
support, treatment or guidance, you can contact your local GP. 
Additional support, advice or information may be found at the following locations. 
 
Samaritans 
Free helpline - 116 123 
 
Saneline 
National out-of-hours mental health helpline – 0300 304 7000 
 
Mind 
www.mind.org.uk 
Mental Health Info Line – Call: 0300 123 3393, Text: 86463 
 
www.nationalparanoianetwork.org 
 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been conducted, please 
contact the study’s supervisor Dr David Harper, School of Psychology, University of East 
London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. D.Harper@uel.ac.uk 
or  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr. Mary Spiller, 
School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. 
(Tel: 020 8223 4004. Email: m.j.spiller@uel.ac.uk) 
 
 
Thank you again. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Elliot Huggins 
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Appendix G – Example Coded Transcript 
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